Red Card: The Battle Over European Football\u27s Transfer System by Irving, James G.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
4-1-2002
Red Card: The Battle Over European Football's
Transfer System
James G. Irving
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle Over European Football's Transfer System, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 667 (2002)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol56/iss3/7
Red Card: The Battle Over European
Football's Transfer System
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with legislation in the 1870s that restricted the number
of hours in a workweek, British workers gained significantly more lei-
sure time with which to pursue recreational activities.' With this
increased, yet still limited "free" time, many turned to the ancient sport
of football.2 This renewed interest in the sport resulted in more concrete
rules for the game, such as limiting the number of players on the field
during a match as well as the size of the field, previously allowed to
stretch over a mile. With the limitation on the number of players per
team, the concept of spectators arose quickly as more people were
forced to sit on the sidelines.4 When crowds watching these friendly
matches began to grow in size and enthusiasm, some business-first
entrepreneurs thought to charge admission to these matches.5 Thus
began the professionalization of football in England, a movement paral-
leled in many other countries throughout Europe.
But with the rise of professional football came labor troubles, some
of which are still being debated in the halls of the European Union (EU)
in Brussels today. Foremost among these troubles has been the transfer
system. Under this system dating back to the 1890s, clubs purchased
and sold players who lacked the ability to freely choose where they
wished to ply their trade. A player could only change clubs through a
transfer in which one club purchased the player's contract from his cur-
rent club.6 While a player could decline a transfer, he could not change
clubs without one. Thus, player owned no right to negotiate the best
possible deal for himself.7 For much of the twentieth century, the trans-
fer system hid behind the defense that it was simply the way that profes-
sional football had always done business. Because of the wealth and
strength of club owners, few players were willing to stand up and defend
their rights.
I. STEVEN TISCHLER, FOOTBALLERS AND BUSINESSMEN: THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCCER IN ENGLAND 35 (1981).
2. Id. at 38.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 40.
6. Id. at 61.
7. Id.
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This Comment will identify some of those players who dared to
risk their careers and reputations by confronting the football establish-
ment. From George Eastham in England to Jean-Marc Bosman in
Belgium, a few brave souls brought their battles to the courts in an
attempt to obtain greater rights for football players. Despite these sacri-
fices for today's players, their actions have also led to the current trans-
fer controversy threatening to destroy the modern game. Therefore, as
one admires the bravery of Eastham, Bosman, and others, one must also
question whether today's turmoil is the next logical step in the battle for
players' rights or whether it is the death knell for European football. As
the future of the sport hangs in the balance, all parties involved must
recognize the possible effects of their actions and that a compromise
might be necessary to ensure the sport's survival. Although clubs tram-
pled on players' rights for most of the twentieth century, the players'
representatives must realize that too much power and freedom in the
hands of the players could have ruinous effects on the game.
Part II of this Comment will provide a historical and legal analysis
of the transfer system, from its creation in the 1890s, through the East-
ham trial in the 1960s. Part III will describe the role of the European
Union and its reach into the realm of sports. Part IV will detail the
Bosman case and its establishment of free agency for European footbal-
lers. Part V will provide an in-depth look at the present transfer conflict
and the agreement that has apparently brought the transfer system in
compliance with EU law. Finally, Part VI will analyze why a compro-
mise has been so difficult to obtain and will discuss future problems for
the new transfer regulations.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM
A. Creation of the Transfer and Retention System in British Football
and the Player's Union
A journalist, commenting on the game of football and the call by
many for free movement of players, felt that it was:
all very well for people to chatter about buying and selling players.
As a matter of principle perhaps it may be wrong, but experience in
managing football clubs shows the absolute necessity for it, and it
will be a bad day for the League, the clubs, and the players when
freedom all round is given. Teams must be comparatively level to
sustain the interest-if they are not, receipts fall off, and without
receipts players cannot be paid wages.8
While this comment may strike a nerve with followers of today's
8. Id. at 62.
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transfer controversy, it was made in 1895. And sentiment such as this
led English football, and ultimately European football, to implement the
transfer system in the late nineteenth century.9 This system required
clubs to produce a list at the end of each season declaring which players
they intended to retain for the following season and which players were
available for transfer to another club.'" A player designated on the
"retention list" had no right to demand a transfer. His only possible
recourse was an appeal to the Football League in order to persuade it to
order a transfer." Furthermore, a player who was placed on the transfer
list was not assured of being able to switch clubs. 2 The selling club
placed a purchase price, or "transfer fee," on each listed player that the
purchasing club would have to pay in order for a transfer to be
completed. 13
The club owners understood that the transfer system violated play-
ers' rights and freedom of contract. They decided, however, that the
system was a necessary evil in order to control player mobility and to
prevent wealthier clubs from buying up all of the best players without
compensating the original club.' 4 Additionally, in an effort to further
control the players, club owners agreed on a maximum wage rule.' 5
Although displeased with the system, the players did not immedi-
ately unite and stand up to the owners. 16 Initial individual efforts at
protest included "playing for one's papers," where a player would delib-
erately under-perform in matches in hopes of forcing his club into a
transfer. 7 Yet, this and other methods were only marginally successful,
and by 1899 there were rumblings throughout British football for the
creation of a players' union.' 8 The threat of release and replacement,
however, chilled this early unionization movement.' 9
Finally, in 1907 a leader emerged, and the Players' Union and Ben-
efit Society was formed.20 Billy Meredith, a winger for Manchester
City, had been forced to become a professional by his club owners.2'
Meredith, known as the "Wizard" because of his playing abilities,
9. See id. at 63.
10. Peter N. Katz, Comment; A History of Free Agency in the United States and Great
Britain: Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 371, 402 (1994).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. TISCHLER, supra note 1, at 62.
15. Id. at 64.
16. See id. at 106.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 107.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 108.
21. Eamon Dunphy, For the Good of the Game; A Court Decision Has Changed Football for
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trained rigorously in order to perform at a high level in each match
before huge crowds.22 Yet, he became concerned that, despite his great
efforts and abilities, his wages were on par with lesser men. As a result
of these concerns and the failure of the football establishment to react to
them, Meredith led the first meeting of the players' union on December
2, 1907.23 The union quickly issued a manifesto setting forth three prin-
cipal demands: (1) an end to wage restraint; (2) freedom of contract; and
(3) access to the laws of the land rather than the corrupt rules of profes-
sional soccer.24
While a main goal of the union was the dismantling of the transfer
and retention system, the battle would not prove easy. 25 In 1912, the
union brought a test case before the King's Bench when the directors of
Aston Villa withheld the registration papers of a "troublemaker" and
overpriced his transfer fee.26 By refusing to transfer the player's papers
to another club, Aston Villa prevented him from playing for any club
willing to match the overpriced transfer fee and effectively ended his
career.27 Despite what appeared to be strong evidence of malicious con-
duct on the part of Aston Villa, the judge ruled for the football league.28
B. Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club: A Harbinger
of Bosman
In 1960, Newcastle United Football Club notified George Eastham,
who was approaching the end of his one-year contract with the club, that
they would retain him for the following season at the same salary.2 9
Under British football's transfer and retention system in place at the
time, a club could effectively hold a player for life by withholding his
playing registration and refusing any and all transfer requests by both
the player and other clubs.30 The British players' union, the Professional
Footballers' Association (PFA), described the players who performed
under this archaic system as "soccer slaves."3
Ever, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 24, 1995, Comment at 21, LEXIS, News Library, Non-
US News File.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Katz, supra note 10, at 403.
26. Id.
27. Frank Keating, Proud Pioneers of the Union's Militant Tendency, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 1, 1992, at 18, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
28. Id.
29. Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club, Ltd., 1964 Ch. 413, 419.
30. Tackling Footballers' Pay, DAILY MAIL (London), Nov. 26, 1999, at 76, LEXIS, News
Library, Non-US News File.
31. Gordon Taylor, Football Must Take Up the Bosman Challenge, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), June 1, 1995, at 38, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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Eastham wanted to sign with rival Arsenal, but, by withholding his
registration from Arsenal, Newcastle prevented a signing.32 He then
appealed to the Football Association (FA) only to be told that this was a
problem between him and Newcastle. The case attracted the attention of
the PFA, and the union filed a writ charging that Newcastle had acted in
restraint of trade. 33 Eastham claimed that the transfer and retention rules
restricted his freedom of movement as he had been unable to pursue his
livelihood for over three months despite having gone through every pos-
sible procedure to obtain the transfer and making it perfectly clear to
Newcastle that he would no longer play for the club.34 The Chancery
Division found that the club owners used the retention system in order to
obtain transfer fees for players that they no longer planned to retain.35
Therefore, the court reasoned, in a situation where a player has made it
very clear that he no longer intends to play for his club, the club "sub-
stantially" interferes with the player's right to seek other employment by
placing him on the retention list.36
The court ultimately found the combined transfer and retention sys-
tem objectionable. It prevented a player from leaving his club or the
league, even though no longer under contract, unless his transfer fee
could be reduced.37 Additionally, the court provided an interesting com-
mentary on the argument of the club owners and the league that the
system had always been used and was generally found in all professional
leagues throughout the world:
The system is an employers' system, set up in an industry where the
employers have succeeded in establishing a united monolithic front
all over the world, and where it is clear that for the purpose of negoti-
ation the employers are vastly more strongly organized than the
employees. No doubt the employers all over the world consider the
system a good system, but this does not prevent the court from con-
sidering whether it goes further than is reasonably necessary to pro-
tect their legitimate interests.38
Because the Chancery Court declared that the transfer and retention sys-
tem was a restraint of trade, a new system was created that allowed a
32. David Lacey, Soccer: Modern Legacy of Eastham's Stand, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Sept. 1, 1990, at Talking Point, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
33. Tom Humphries, Evils That Soccer Can Do Without, THE IRISH TIMES, July 26, 1999, at
57, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
34. Eastham, 1964 Ch. at 429. Eastham was quoted as having said, "No matter what they
say, no matter what they do, I've played my last match for Newcastle." Ken Jones, Football: The
Death of Loyalty and Respect in Football, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 6, 1998, at 22,
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
35. Eastham, 1964 Ch. at 430.
36. Id. at 430-31.
37. Id. at 438.
38. Id.
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player to move without a transfer fee if the club failed to offer him a
contract that at least equaled his previous contract.39
In 1978, British football further amended the "English transfer sys-
tem" to allow a player to decline his club's offer and to move on to the
team of his choice."n If his new club and former club could not agree on
a transfer fee, a four-person transfer tribunal determined the fee.4 Even
though it was not until 1978 that players finally secured free agency,42
George Eastham is still considered a legendary figure in British football
because of his earlier efforts.
Despite the changes to the English system, the Eastham case hardly
impacted the transfer system throughout Europe. Many countries, such
as Belgium, continued to use the pre-Eastham system.43 The continued
use of this system fueled the transfer battle dominating European foot-
ball for the past decade; perhaps an unnecessary battle had more Euro-
pean football associations paid heed to the Eastham decision.
III. THE REACH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION INTO THE AFFAIRS
OF FOOTBALL
A. The European Commission and the European Court of Justice
Understanding the transfer controversies of the last decade within
the European Union requires a basic understanding of the EU and some
of its organizational bodies. In 1957, six nations signed the Treaty of
Rome (the EU Treaty) forming the European Economic Community.
The EU Treaty established the four governing bodies of the EU, includ-
ing the European Commission (EC or the Commission) and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ).4 4 The EC, comprised today of seventeen
commissioners with at least one from each Member State, proposes leg-
islation, enforces treaty provisions, and, most importantly, possesses
absolute enforcement power and control over competition law.45
The ECJ, comprised of fifteen judges, one from each Member
State, ensures universal application of the laws of the EU.4 6 The ECJ
rules on the legality of actions of the other EU governing bodies, as well
as preliminary rulings on national courts' requests for interpretations of
39. Taylor, supra note 31.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Lacey, supra note 32.
43. Tackling Footballers' Pay, supra note 30, at 76.
44. Rachel B. Arnedt, Comment, European Union Law and Football Nationality Restrictions:
The Economics and Politics of the Bosman Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1091, 1092-94
(1998).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1095.
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EU law.47 Also part of the ECJ structure are the Advocate Generals who
provide detailed recommendations, or "advisory opinions," before the
ECJ rules on a question.48 While these advisory opinions are not bind-
ing on the parties involved,49 as will be seen in the analysis of the Advo-
cate General's opinion in Bosman and the following' reactions, the
recommendations are considered by many as final.
B. Articles 48, 85, and 86 of the EU Treaty
Generally, in the course of the transfer battles, three provisions of
the EU Treaty are cited: Articles 48, 85, and 86. Article 48 guarantees
freedom of movement for workers within the Community and calls for
abolition of any employment discrimination based on nationality. 0
Article 48 does not apply, however, to employment situations com-
pletely internal to a Member State. 5' To illustrate, George Eastham
would have to show evidence that he desired a transfer to a club outside
of Great Britain if he wished to argue his case before the ECJ today.
Without such evidence, the provisions of Article 48 would not apply
because it would be a situation completely internal and not affecting the
common market.
Articles 85 and 86 apply to competition, which is considered vital
to a market-based economy. 52  Article 85(1) prohibits agreements
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1095-96.
49. Id.
50. Article 48 states:
(1) Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by
the end of the transitional period at the latest. (2) Such freedom of movement shall
entail the abolition of any discrimination based on the nationality between workers
of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of
works and employment. (3) It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: (a) to accept offers of
employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States
for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in
accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory
of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions
which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the
Commission. (4) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in
the public service.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 48, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaies/en/entr6dO3.htm [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
The article, however, does allow for certain exceptions to free movement if justified on the
grounds of public policy, public security, or public health.
51. Andrew L. Lee, Comment, The Bosman Case: Protecting Freedom of Movement in
European Football, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1255, 1265 (1996).
52. Id. at 1266-67.
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between "undertakings" '53  or associations of undertakings that may
affect trade between Member States and that may result in the "preven-
tion, restriction, or distortion" of competition. 54 Article 85(2) declares
that any agreements violating the provisions of subsection (1) are auto-
matically void.55 Article 86 prohibits undertakings from abusing a dom-
inant position within the market negatively affecting trade between
Member States.56
53. The case law of the EU has found "undertaking" to cover all entities involved in
economic activity despite its legal status or its financing. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des
Societes de Football (Association) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5026-27, [1996 1
C.M.L.R. 645, 742-43 (1996).
54. Article 85 states:
(I) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control
production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or
sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. (2) Any agreements or
decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. (3) The
provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; any decision or
category of decisions by associations of undertakings; any concerted practice or
category of concerted practices; - which contributes to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a)
impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EEC Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 85, available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/
entr6d05.htm.
55. Id.
56. Article 86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market in so far as it may affect trade between the Member States. Such
abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production,
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
EEC Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 86, available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/
entr6d05.htm.
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C. The Impact of the Walrave and Dona Decisions
Prior to the explosion of the transfer battles of the 1990s, two lesser
known decisions by the ECJ helped to establish the lines, albeit fuzzy
ones, between areas where sporting associations could and could not
create regulations free from EC interference. In 1974, a national court
referred a question to the ECJ asking whether certain rules of a national
cycling association, which required the pacemaker to be the same
nationality as the rider, would be incompatible with EU principles of
free movement of labor.57 The ECJ held that sport practices were sub-
ject to the rules of the EU insofar as they constituted an economic activ-
ity.58 Activities hindering the freedom of movement would be
acceptable, however, if they were of a "purely sporting interest."59 The
cycling association argued that its rules were the legal act of an associa-
tion that did not fall under public law.6" The ECJ rejected this argu-
ment, stating that freedom of movement was a fundamental right of the
EU and would be greatly weakened if barriers to free movement could
be defended as being the work of an association or organization not
subject to public law.6" The opinion acknowledged for the first time that
Article 48 applied not only to the rules of public employment, but also
to those of private employment, such as a cycling or even professional
football.6"
Two years later, the nationality restrictions of a football association
were questioned before the ECJ.6 3 Reaffirming the Walrave ruling, the
ECJ again held that sporting activities were subject to EU regulations so
long as they were sporting in nature. 64 The court provided the football
associations with an example of a sporting regulation that was purely
sporting in nature - prohibiting the use of foreign players in matches
played by the national team of that Member State.65 But the court also
warned that such a provision must "remain limited to its proper
objective. ' 66
These two decisions would impact transfer debates over twenty
years later as opposing sides battled over whether the transfer rules of
57. Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union Cycliste
Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, 1417, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320, 331 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1418, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1418-19, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332-33.
62. Arnedt, supra note 44, at 1101.
63. Case 13\76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, 1338 [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578, 585
(1976).
64. Id. at 1340, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 586.
65. Id. at 1340, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587.
66. Id.
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the football associations were of a purely sporting interest or whether
they constituted an economic activity, and, ultimately, whether such a
distinction was even possible in the world of the modem professional
sports.
IV. BOSMAN
In 1995, a bomb was dropped on European football altering its
landscape for years to come. A little known Belgian football player
named Jean-Marc Bosman challenged the legal basis of the transfer sys-
tem battling his way to the ECJ. But before analyzing this groundbreak-
ing decision, one must delve into the background of the case.
A. The Football Family - FIFA, UEFA, and the
National Associations
In order to understand European football, one must understand the
international hierarchy of football. The Federation Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA), headquartered in Switzerland, is the
sport's world governing body.6 7 As the leader of what at times appears
to be football's dysfunctional family, FIFA is divided into several
regional federations whom it permits to adopt their own transfer rules.6 8
The Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA), one such
federation,69 governs football in Europe.7° Each European country has a
national association that is a member of UEFA.7 The Belgian associa-
tion, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association ASNL
(URBSFA), is therefore a member of UEFA and, as such, can adhere to
UEFA rules or may adopt its own rules.72
B. The Belgian Transfer Rules
The transfer rules that applied to Jean-Marc Bosman were those of
the URBSFA. While the rules of FIFA and UEFA could have been
included in each national association's rules, national associates retained
discretion to enforce them more or less stringently.73 Under the Belgian
transfer rules in place at the time, a player nearing the end of his playing
contract, all of which uniformly ended on June 30, was entitled to a new
67. Lee, supra note 51, at 1284.
68. Amikam Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The Relationship Between European Union
Law and the Transfer System in European Football, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431, 435 (1999).
69. Id.
70. Arnedt, supra note 44, at 1103.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association v. Jean-Marc
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5046, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645, 756 (1996).
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contract offered by his club by April 26. Otherwise, he would become
an amateur."4 If the player refused an offered contract, his club could
place him on a "compulsory" transfer list active through May. An inter-
ested club could purchase the player from this list for a -compensation
fee for training, which was calculated by multiplying the player's gross
annual income by a varying factor depending upon his age.75 If the orig-
inal club failed to obtain a transfer for the player by May 31, then a
period of "free transfers" opened on June 1, during which clubs could
set a mutually agreeable transfer fee.76
If there was still no transfer at the end of this period, then the club
was obligated to repeat the April 26 offer to the player.77 If the player
refused the offer again, the club had until August 1 to suspend him.78
Once suspended, the player had to either accept whatever offer his club
might still make or sit out for two seasons, after which he could obtain a
transfer without the club's consent. 79
Additionally, pre-Bosman FIFA regulations prohibited a player
who was bound by either contract or club or national rules from leaving
his national association to play in another country.8" After the incidents
described infra, UEFA adopted a supplement to its regulations, which
declared that no economic disagreement between clubs over a transfer
fee was to affect the playing status of the player.8' With this amend-
ment, UEFA clearly intended to demonstrate that the failure of two clubs
to immediately agree on a transfer fee would not prevent a player from
playing for his new club.
C. The Case of Jean-Marc Bosman
Jean-Marc Bosman was a footballer for RC Liege, a Belgian first
division club, earning approximately 120,000 Belgian francs (Bfr)82 per
month, including bonuses.83 In 1990, as Bosman's contract neared its
end, RC Liege made a pre-April 26 contract offer for 30,000 Bfr per
month, markedly less than his previous contract.84 When he refused to
accept the offer, RC Liege placed Bosman on the compulsory transfer
74. Id. at 1-5045, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 755-56.
75. Id. at 1-5045, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 756.
76. Id. at 1-5046, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 756.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1-5047, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 757.
81. Id. at 757-58.
82. On January 15, 2001, one hundred BFR was worth approximately $2.35 in the United
States as Bosman's monthly salary would have been $2,820.
83. Bosman, at 1-5050, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 759.
84. Id.
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list with a compensation fee of 11,743,000 Bfr as determined by the set
standards. This fee was approximately four times what RC Liege had
paid him in obtaining him.15 Not surprisingly, no club made an offer for
this staggering fee during the compulsory period.86 Subsequently, dur-
ing the free transfer period, Bosman arranged a contract with US
Dunkerque, a second division French club, for 100,000 Bfr per month
and a signing bonus of 900,000 Bfr.87 RC Liege and US Dunkerque
agreed on a temporary transfer of Bosman for one year for a fee of
1,200,000 Bfr to be paid to RC Liege upon US Dunkerque's receipt of
Bosman's playing certificate.88
But RC Liege, concerned that US Dunkerque would not be able to
make the required payments, never had the registration sent to the Fed-
eration Francaise de Football (FFF).89 Ultimately, the transfer never
materialized, and, before the mandatory August 1 deadline, RC Liege
suspended Bosman.9° Therefore, in a manner reminiscent of the transfer
and retention system that George Eastham battled in England in the
1960s, the Belgian transfer system effectively blocked Bosman from
playing any professional football for the 1990-91 season.9'
What followed for Bosman was a tortuous four-year ride through
national courts, which ended with two questions being referred by the
Belgian national court to the ECJ. One question dealt with the regula-
tions of the football associations concerning foreign players and whether
they violated Article 48.92 The other question, more important here,
focused on whether Articles 48, 85, and 86 prohibited a "football club
from requiring and receiving payment of a sum of money upon the
engagement of one of its players who has come to the end of his contract
by a new employing club."93
D. Reaction Throughout European Football Leading Up to the
Bosman Hearing Before the ECJ
As Bosman worked his way through the Belgian and European
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1-5050-51, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 759.
88. Id. at 1-5051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 759.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Interestingly, Bosman could have obtained a transfer without a fee under the English
system that arose out of the Eastham decision, where a player could walk without a transfer fee at
the end of his contract if his club failed to offer him a salary at least equal to his previous contract.
Martin Thorpe, Soccer: Bosman Case Could End Transfers; Football under Threat, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 4, 1995, at 18, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
92. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-5056, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 762.
93. Id.
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courts, UEFA and the national associations were slow to realize that his
case posed an actual threat to something so fundamental to European
football as the transfer system.94 Traditionally, UEFA had been able to
keep the EC from attacking the transfer rules on free movement of labor
grounds. 95 But once the above-mentioned questions were referred to the
ECJ, UEFA was forced to take the threat more seriously. In fact, most
legal experts predicted a ruling favorable to Bosman even before the
hearing in front of the ECJ.96 UEFA began to voice concerns that a
ruling in favor of Bosman would give players too much control,
allowing them to constantly change clubs. Such a scenario would leave
fans in a state of confusion as to who played for their favorite side.97
UEFA also complained that a Bosman victory would bankrupt smaller
clubs that relied heavily financially on transfer fees from larger clubs.98
The players' association for all of professional football, Interna-
tional Federation of Professional Footballers (FIFPro), as well as
national players' unions, such as the PFA in England and Scotland,
shared this sentiment.99 Although a favorable decision for Bosman
might allow for freer movement and higher salaries for players, Gordon
Taylor, the head of both FIFPro and the British PFA, could not fully
support them. He believed that a Bosman victory could lead to the
destruction of the highly successful English player development system
under which approximately 1,250 players between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen were trained annually. 1" Taylor felt as though the blame
for Bosman's situation should lie exclusively with the Belgian football
association.10'
In the months leading up to the June 1995 ECJ hearing, many in the
football community expected Bosman to take some kind of "payoff' and
disappear forever. 0 2 In fact, on the eve of the June hearing, it was
rumored that UEFA had offered Bosman $1 million "to buy his
94. Colin Malam, Soccer: Trade Union Fights UEFA over Soccer "Slave Trade," SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 10, 1993, at 24, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
95. Id.
96. See Joe Melling, He May Just Be an Unknown Belgian but His Court Case Could Change
the Shape of Our Football Forever, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Feb. 5, 1995, at 84, LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US News File.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Hugh Keevins, Price of Freedom Runs High, THE SCOTSMAN, June 20, 1995, at 34,
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
100. Taylor, supra note 31, at 38.
101. Id. See also Ken Gallacher, Tackling the Question of Transfers, THE HERALD (Glasgow),
June 20, 1995, at 32, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
102. See Rob Hughes, A Sport Courting Disaster, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (Neuilly-
sur-Seine, France), Mar. 8, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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silence."' °3 For Bosman, however, the crusade had developed into
something more than just compensation.'° 4 Only days before the hear-
ing, he declared, "My career is almost finished but this has become a
matter of principle."'' 0 5
The inability of the football authorities to avoid the June hearing
simply highlighted the poor organization of UEFA. Although the case
had been on-going for almost five years, UEFA did not publicly show
much concern until the six months leading up to the ECJ hearing.10 6
Even in its arguments before the ECJ, UEFA appeared to believe that it
did not belong in the litigation. UEFA argued that it was not involved in
Bosman's transfer, despite its role as the governing body for European
football.0 7 Further, UEFA, as it had for years, essentially ignored the
existence of FIFPro, relying instead on its historical influence over the
EC to keep the transfer system free from scrutiny.° 8 Although the first
meetings ever between UEFA and FIFPro took place that spring, UEFA
did not move quickly enough, perhaps pinning its hopes on Bosman tak-
ing a money payment. 09 FIEFPro's Taylor, however, counseled against
such action, warning that a settlement would merely postpone the prob-
lem until the next Bosman arrived." 0
E. The Recommendations of the Advocate-General
On September 20, 1995, the Advocate-General for the ECJ, Carr
Otto Lenz, released his recommendations to the court and the public."'
Lenz first advised that the transfer rules violated Article 48, since a
player could not move from a club in one Member State to a club in
another without payment of a transfer fee and release of the player's
registration to the new association." 2 Lenz was not swayed by FIFA
and UEFA rules that prohibited a dispute between two clubs over the
transfer fee from affecting a player's status with his new club. Realisti-
103. Keevins, supra note 99, at 34.
104. Archie MacGregor, Bosman's Case Set to Shock Football, SUNDAY TIMES, June 18, 1995,
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
105. Id.
106. This is a familiar theme with UEFA and FIFA that has repeated itself with potentially
disastrous consequences in the current transfer strife.
107. See Bruce McHenry, Bosman Hailed for Challenging Goliath, THE SCOTSMAN, June 21,
1995, at 31, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
108. Brian Wilson, Innocent Abroad in Pursuit of Justice: Bosman Poised to Make Football
History, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Apr. 13, 1995, at 24, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
109. See Taylor, supra note 31, at 38.
110. Id.
111. See Ian Paul, Only the Rich May Survive Ruling, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 21, 1995,
at 7, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
112. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association v. Jean-Marc
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5010-11, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645, 727 (1996).
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cally, neither team would allow the transfer to go through without the
possibility of an agreement over the transfer fee." 
3
Second, Lenz advised that the transfer rules restricted competition
within the meaning of Article 85(1).' " The rules replaced traditional
market ideals of supply and demand by attempting to "preserve" the
current competition situation.'"' Without the transfer rules in place,
players would move freely at the end of their contracts, allowing low-
end clubs the opportunity to engage these players and improve their
standing in the sport." 16 Thus, the current rules restricted competition in
the manner intended by the larger clubs and national associations." 7
While Lenz acknowledged that the transfer rules could be exempted
under article 85(3), only the Commission could grant such an exemption
and only by formal decision." 8
Finally, Lenz found that the transfer rules did not violate Article 86,
which required abuse of a dominant market position." 9 He reasoned
that it was the clubs, not the associations, UEFA, nor FIFA, who were at
fault because the rules concerned the "engagement of players."' 2 °
Therefore, because an agreement between clubs could hardly be classi-
fied as a "dominant position within the common market," an Article 86
violation could not be found.' 2 '
F. Reaction of the Football World to the Recommendation of the
Advocate General and Anticipation of the ECJ Ruling
Many within the European football community quickly declared
Lenz's opinion the "death knell" of football, describing it as a "recipe
for disaster."' 22 Two central arguments were put forward against the
opinion of the Advocate General: (1) small clubs faced bankruptcy with-
out transfer fees and would disappear; and (2) larger clubs stood to lose
their largest assets off their balance sheets. 23 Many believed that
smaller clubs, who relied on transfer fees in order to stay financially
113. See id.
114. Id. at 1-5029-30, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 745-46.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1-5036, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 751.
119. Id. at 1-5037, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 752-53.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1-5038-39, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 754.
122. Stephen Bates, Bosman Ruling Signals Chaos, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 15, 1995,
at 26, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File. See also Jimmy Hill, Recipe for Disaster, THE
OBSERVER, Sept. 24, 1995, at 10, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File; Trevor Haylett,
UEFA Unites to Defend Transfers, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 4, 1995, at 28, LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US News File.
123. Robert Rice, Business and the Law: Ball Put in Europe's Court - Football's Transfer
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afloat and to continue to develop young talent, would be driven into
bankruptcy by an ECJ decision outlawing all transfer fees. 124 Some of
these clubs, it was argued, relied on the periodic sale of its players in
order to finance complex development systems.12 5
Another chief UEFA complaint was that abolition of the transfer
fees would immediately threaten the financial strength of larger clubs.
126
Traditionally, larger clubs included players in the club's assets because
the clubs could retain their value at the end of the contracts.1 27 Many of
these larger clubs feared that an ECJ decision affirming Lenz's recom-
mendations would instantly wipe millions off clubs' balance sheets.1 28
In the case of a negative decision, these clubs hoped, at a minimum, for
a grace period that would allow the clubs, associations, and players an
opportunity to adjust to the new rules. 129
In addition to protesting the grounds of Lenz's opinion, UEFA
immediately began lobbying the EC for a special exemption from the
labor laws of the EU. 1 30  Such an exemption, UEFA argued, would
acknowledge that the transfer rules were necessary to prevent a cartel of
super-rich clubs from completely dominating the sport.13 ' This effort
was a long shot for UEFA because, earlier in the year, the EC had
rejected these arguments, stating that the transfer system was essential
neither for the organization of the sport, for the survival of smaller clubs,
nor for maintaining a balance between small and large clubs. 132
From the player's perspective, the potential outcome created enthu-
siasm, surely due in large part to the possibility of larger financial
rewards. 133 One of Bosman's attorneys, a former head of a players'
association, stated, "We have waited 25 years for a player with sufficient
courage, prepared to accept penalties, to challenge the transfer sys-
tem."' 3 4 This excitement was shared by football agents salivating over
System for Players Could Be in Doubt, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 19, 1995, at 30, LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US News File.
124. See Bates, supra note 122, at 10.
125. Paul, supra note 111, at 7.
126. See Bates, supra note 122, at 10.
127. Id.
128. Rice, supra note 123, at 30.
129. Murray Ritchie, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 18, 1995, at 13, LEXIS, News Library,
Non-US News File.
130. Robert Rice and Patrick Harverson, Football Transfers Threatened by Court Judgment,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 21, 1995, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
131. Court Hearing Set to Signal End of Football Transfer System, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 19, 2001, at Sports, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
132. Rice, supra note 123, at 30.
133. Henry Winter and John Ley, Football: The Bosman Case, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept.
21, 1995, at 32, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
134. Bates, supra note 122, at 10.
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the prospect of larger salaries providing larger commissions.135 One
agent reveled that the decision would force club owners to step into the
"real world" where someone could rent a television set and walk away
from it at the end of the contract.' 36 The forecasts of impending death
for small clubs was characterized as "rubbish." A small club would sim-
ply sign a young player to a seven or eight-year deal. The club would
then have plenty of time to develop the young talent and sell him to a
large club for a huge profit.137
The players' associations, however remained unsure of the proper
stance to take on the transfer issue. Nevertheless, both the British PFA
and the Scottish PFA concurred that this outcome had been evident from
a long way off.1 38 Tony Higgins, a leader in the Scottish PFA, claimed
to have warned the leaders of European football for some time, but his
advice was not heeded until it was too late.'39 According to Higgins,
UEFA had always conveyed a nonchalant attitude about the transfer
system. 140
The potential ruling caused far less panic in Britain. The feeling
was that British football already had in place a system after which the
ECJ, EC, or UEFA could model a new system.' 4' The leadership of
the Premier League, the top division in British football, believed that the
UK used a workable system that had developed out of the Eastham case.
They argued that if UEFA attempted to set up a similar system, the
whole controversy would go away.1 42
Finally, critics questioned whether the abolition of the transfer sys-
tem was the relief that Bosman had sought when he started the legal
process five years earlier.'43 With the possibility of a ruling in favor of
Bosman that could preserve the often rigid hierarchy of top football
clubs throughout Europe, there was some doubt as to whether this was
135. Fears for Small Clubs over Bosman Case, AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 20, 1995,
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See Winter and Ley, supra note 133, at 32. See also Paul, supra note 111, at 7.
139. Paul, supra note 111, at 7.
140. Mike Wilson, Clubs Pay High Price for the Continental Drift, SUNDAY TIMES, July 21,
1996, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File. "For more than 10 years, we have been warning
that the transfer system could not last, but UEFA refused to negotiate. When compromise was
available, nobody sought it." Kevin McCarra, Bosman Case is not Proven, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec.
15, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
141. Rob King, Soccer Clubs May Lose Fortunes in Transfer Shake-up, PRESS ASSOCIATION
NEWSFILE, Sept. 20, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
142. Ian Hawkey, Bosman Leaves Game in Limbo, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US News File.
143. See Paul, supra note 111, at 7; Hawkey, supra note 142.
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the goal that Bosman had envisioned.' 44 One critic compared Bosman's
case with that of Curt Flood, the American baseball player who, in the
1970s, single-handedly challenged the "reserve clause" of baseball.
Flood had also likened the reserve clause to "slavery," with team owners
moving players "from one plantation to another" even at the end of a
player's contract. 145 Similar to Bosman, Flood risked his career in order
to challenge the sport's traditional practices. 146 What was characterized
at the time as a necessary action for the good of the game of baseball
had led, however, by the mid-1990s, to a players' strike when the own-
ers attempted to implement a salary cap to keep salaries from skyrocket-
ing out of control. 147 The potential for skyrocketing football salaries
begged the question of whether Bosman had envisioned or desired such
change, in the same manner that Flood had likely not envisioned for
baseball. 48
F. The Decision of the ECJ in Bosman
On Friday, December 14, 1995, the ECJ handed down its opinion
in Bosman's lawsuit.' 49 The ECJ first ruled that Article 48 applied to
the rules of sporting associations so long as the rules defined the terms
under which "sportsmen" can be employed. 5° The Court held that the
transfer rules served as an obstacle to freedom of movement because the
rules effectively precluded a player from seeking to play in another
Member State if his transfer fee was not paid.' 5 ' The ECJ pointed out
that the UEFA rules adopted in 1990 allowing a transfer to go through
even if there was dispute between the clubs over the fee were useless.
The potential penalties on a club for not paying the fee essentially served
as an obstacle.' 52 As a result of these findings, the court reasoned, the
transfer rules could only survive if there was a legitimate aim consistent
with the Treaty. Further, a pressing public interest had to justify the
rules, which could go no further than necessary to achieve their
purpose. 153
The ECJ then examined the major justifications for the transfer
144. Id.
145. Hawkey, supra note 142. See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
146. Hawkey, supra note 142.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Urgent, AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 15, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News
File.
150. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Begle des Societes de Football Assocition v. Jean-Marc
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5062, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645, 769 (1996).
151. Id. at 1-5069, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 770.
152. Id. at 1-5070, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 771.
153. Id. at 1-5071, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 772.
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rules: that the transfer rules were necessary (1) to "maintain a financial
and competitive balance between clubs"; and (2) to promote the continu-
ation of development programs for young footballers.' 54 The ECJ
rejected the first justification because the transfer rules prevented neither
the rich clubs from obtaining the best players nor monetary resources
from being the decisive factor in competition between clubs. 55 The
court also dismissed the second justification, citing the difficulty in pre-
dicting whether a young player would be a future star and therefore a
future profit as a transfer.'56 Additionally, the court found that the exor-
bitant transfer fees paid to the small clubs were hardly related to the cost
of training and developing such players.
157
Further, the ECJ pointed out the alternatives set out in Lenz's advi-
sory opinion as less restrictive means of accomplishing the same
goals. 158 These alternatives included instituting a salary cap and estab-
lishing revenue sharing agreements between clubs that would redistrib-
ute income, such as ticket sales and television profits, to other clubs.' 59
UEFA's then current use of a redistribution system to share receipts
from certain competitions and international matches supported the argu-
ment that UEFA and its supporters desired to promote football through
an income redistribution system. 60 Finally, the ECJ, contrary to the
hopes of the football authorities, held that the transfer system for out-of-
contract players was to immediately cease, although transfer fees that
had been paid prior to the Court's decision were to be allowed.'
6 1
G. Reaction to the Bosman Decision
Immediately following the decision, UEFA's primary goal was to
keep the transfer system alive and well for players under contract.
62
Additionally, UEFA interpreted Bosman as dealing only with cross-bor-
der transfers; therefore it considered fees for end-of-contract transfers
between clubs within a single Member State as still permitted.' 63 UEFA
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1-5071-72, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 772.
156. Id. at 1-5072, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 772.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1-5072, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 773.
159. Id. at 1-5017, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 733.
160. Id. at 1-5019, [19961 1 C.M.L.R. at 735-36. As for the interpretation of Articles 85 and 86
with respect to the transfer system, the Court ruled that a decision on this issue was unnecessary
because the system was already in violation of Article 48. Id. at 1-5078, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at
776.
161. Id. at 1-5080, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 777.
162. William Gray, Soccer: Transfers Ruling Clarified, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 18, 1995,
at 3, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
163. Id.
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also still believed that a solution to cross-border transfer fees could be
worked out with the EC. 16 4
British football sought to minimize the damage by arguing that,
because Scotland was not recognized as an independent EU Member
State, "internal" transfers between England and Scotland should be unaf-
fected by the Bosman decision.1 6' This argument was complicated
because UEFA recognized England and Scotland as separate mem-
bers. 166 Many commentators questioned whether such an argument
would even matter once the transfers between Member States began to
take place without a fee.167 With the ability to freely obtain out-of-con-
tract players from other Member States, some doubted whether an
English club would pay a fee for a Scottish player, or vice versa.168
A little over a month after the Bosman decision, the Commission
entered the fray by giving FIFA and UEFA six weeks to accept the total
abolition of cross-border transfer fees and threatening court action for
failure to do SO. 169 The EC once again rejected the call for a sporting
exception. Comparing the grant of such an exception to the opening of
Pandora's Box, the EC feared it would invite the call for similar excep-
tions from other socio-political categories, thus weakening the funda-
mental right of free movement.' 70 Characterizing the sporting exception
request as "blocking tactics," the EC believed that UEFA's time would
be better spent formulating a plan for the future, rather than attempting
to maintain an outlawed system. 7 1
One of the positive outcomes for European football arising out of
the Bosman decision was UEFA's ultimate recognition of FIFPro and
the other national players' associations. 172 The players' associations
agreed that a plan had to be created whereby certain clubs would retain a
financial incentive to continue their youth development programs while
adhering to the Bosman ruling and allowing players to move freely at the
164. Angus MacKinnon, UEFA "Ignoring the Law" Over Transfer Rules, AGENCY FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 19, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
165. See Mike Aitken, UK Transfers Still Threatened, THE SCOTSMAN, Dec. 23, 1995, at 25,
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
166. Id.
167. Brian Wilson, Bosman Ruling Won't Go Offside, THE HERALD (Glasgow), July 1, 1996,
at 11, LEXIS, News Library Non-US News File.
168. Id.
169. Murray Ritchie, Threat to UEFA over EU Rules, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 20, 1996,
at 32, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File. There has been some discussion over whether
the EC overextended itself in its involvement since the ECJ decision was based exclusively on
free movement grounds. See generally Kranz, supra note 68.
170. Ritchie, supra note 169, at 32.
171. Id.
172. See Tony Higgins, Legal Challenge Could End UK Transfer Fees, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar.
25, 1996, at 22, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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end of their contracts. 7 3 Joint discussions between FIFPro and UEFA
led to various proposals, such as training compensation reviewed by an
independent tribunal or the creation of a "pool of money" to compensate
teams committed to training young talent.' 74
Unfortunately, the process of change was not a quick one. Actual
changes to the internal transfer system in Britain did not take place until
almost two and a half years after the Bosman decision. 75 The massive
migration of foreign players into British football as a result of the new
rule on free movement at the end of a contract (and the abolition of rules
restricting the number of foreign players per team) provided motivation
for the ultimate change.1 76 As many predicted following the Bosman
decision, British clubs consistently looked abroad to bring in foreign
talent for no fee. 177 The British football authorities feared that, if the
internal system was not fixed, the future development of young British
footballers would be in jeopardy.1 78
Finally, in June 1997, the British Premier League announced that,
beginning the following June, all players aged twenty-four and above
would become free agents at the end of their contracts allowing them to
move freely among clubs within Britain.' 7 9 All players under twenty-
four with terminating contracts could be transferred subject to "compen-
satory" fees. 8 ° This new system sought to provide British clubs with a
larger talent pool of home-grown players and to prevent clubs from
looking too quickly across the borders. 8 ' While England and Scotland
could have legally maintained the internal transfer system, the wide-
spread belief throughout football was that the current system would eas-
ily fall if challenged in a court of law by another Bosman.' 82 More
importantly, most believed change was necessary to ensure the "future
stability" of the game and to unite players, clubs, and associations
behind a common front. 1
83
173. Id.
174. Wilson, supra note 167, at 11.
175. Neil McLeman, Tranfer Fees to Be Scrapped for Older Players, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar. 2,
1998, at 25, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
176. See Steve McManaman, Cut-price Imports Threaten Disaster for Domestic Game, THE
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Louise Taylor, Crunch Meeting on Transfer Free Reform, SUNDAY TIMES, June 8, 1997,
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Ian Paul, Bosman Ruling to Affect British Transfers, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 24,
1997, at 35, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File. See also Talyor, supra note 179.
183. League's Bosman Pledge to Clubs, BRISTOL EVENING POST, Oct. 24, 1997, at 66, LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US News File.
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The change was welcomed by the players' associations and by
agents who recognized that the new system shifted some of the balance
of power in the sport from the clubs towards the players.' 8 4 Players
could see that if they merely sat tight until their contracts ran out, then
they would be able to sign with the highest bidder. Moreover, much of
the money that was previously paid to the selling club in the form of a
transfer fee could now be obtained by the player as a large "signing-on"
fee. 185
The new system, however, did not eliminate the obvious threat of
extinction for clubs that relied heavily on the transfer fees for sur-
vival. "'86 These clubs argued that the compensation fee to be paid for
under-twenty-four transfers would be a mere pittance of what it cost a
club to develop a player.' 87 In August 1988, accounting experts,
Deloitte & Touche, predicted that approximately half of the lower level
clubs would be forced to merge or become part-time clubs because of
lack of funds.' 88 One suggested remedy was for some of the smaller
clubs to become feeder clubs to larger clubs, similar to minor league
affiliates in Major League Baseball.'8 9 The feeder club alternative
would be problematic in Britain, however, because it would destroy
much of the excitement created during the "FA Cup" and "Worthington
Cup" in which all clubs, from all divisions large and small, play in the
same tournament. Much of the excitement of this competition has been
built on past upsets by small clubs over the larger, wealthier clubs.
Turning much of the lower divisions into feeder leagues would alter the
nature of these competitions.
V. THE TRANSFER TURMOIL OF THE PRESENT
A. Signs of Trouble
As FIFA, UEFA, and the various national associations and clubs
throughout Europe came to grips with the Bosman judgment's impact on
the transfer system, the fact that Bosman only prohibited transfer fees for
players after their contracts had expired provided solace. 9 ° Clubs could
184. See McLeman, supra note 175, at 25.
185. Whole New Ball Game . . . The Bosman Ruling: What It Means, EVENING HERALD
(Plymouth), Mar. 20, 1998, at 45, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
186. See Martin Wood, They Think It's All Over - It May Well Be; Report Finds Small Clubs
Under Threat as Millions Dribble Past, BIRMINGHAM POST, Aug. 7, 1998, at 22, LEXIS, News
Library, Non-US News File.
187. Benchmark Yet To Be Set, EVENING NEWS (Edinburgh), July 4, 1998, at 26, LEXIS, News
Library, Non-US News File.
188. Wood, supra note 186, at 22.
189. Id.
190. See Gray, supra note 162, at 3.
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still receive transfer fees for the sale of players still under contract.191
Because close to ninety percent of transfer revenue came from in-con-
tract transfers, the football authorities preferred to preserve this branch
of the transfer system. 192
But now the football authorities had a new problem. Prior to Bos-
man, the EC had largely stayed out of the realm of sport. Now, how-
ever, the EC was much more aware of what was going on in European
football.' 93 By 1997, the EC began to question the entire transfer sys-
tem, and, most notably, the exorbitant fees that clubs charged for mid-
contract transfers.
194
One event that brought the system under EC scrutiny was the trans-
fer of Ronaldo, a Brazilian striker considered at the time to be the best
player in the world, from Barcelona of Spain to Inter Milan of Italy.
195
Inter Milan had already paid twenty-six million dollars to allow Ronaldo
to buy out the remaining term of his contract. But Barcelona demanded
an additional transfer fee to complete the transfer. 196 Citing a FIFA rule
prohibiting a player from buying out his contract to obtain a "free trans-
fer," Barcelona and the Spanish football association demanded that
FIFA withhold Ronaldo's international transfer certificate until Inter
Milan agreed to pay the transfer fee. 197
Before FIFA responded, the EC sent a letter warning Sepp Blatter,
secretary-general of FIFA, that the EC might view an additional transfer
fee as a violation of Article 48 of the Treaty.' 98 Although the letter
clearly stated that the EC position was merely a "preliminary" one, FIFA
should have noticed that there might be trouble ahead. Instead, two
months later, FIFA ordered Inter Milan to pay an additional $1.8 million
in order to complete the transfer.1 99 Subsequently, in April 1998, the EC
officially ordered FIFA to amend its transfer rules or face official
action." ° This warning, which would be the first of several attempts by
the EC to give the football world proper notice and opportunity to
change, apparently fell upon deaf ears as the transfer system moved on.
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As time went on and court cases challenging the transfer system
mounted, the EC saw the need to abolish transfer fees altogether.20 '
The magnitude of the issue was not lost on the British football
authorities. 2  They particularly feared the ability of players to leave
their respective clubs on short notice (a few weeks or a month) and the
ability of clubs to release players at any point during their contracts.20 3
A player's ability to simply leave a small club in the middle of his con-
tract club to sign for the bright lights and higher salaries of the larger,
upper division clubs posed an even greater risk to player development
than did the Bosman decision.20 4
Threat became reality for the British football world in the summer
of 1999. Nicolas Anelka, a Frenchman playing for Arsenal, threatened
the club with court action for refusing to transfer him to the Italian club
Lazio in exchange for the remaining value of his contract. 20 5 Some legal
experts predicted the destruction of the mid-contract transfer system, lik-
ening it to slavery and arguing that it still existed merely because no one
had challenged it.206
The opposing view was that the EU and England both legally rec-
ognized fixed-contracts. 0 7 Moreover, English law required that dam-
ages for breach of contract put the injured party where it would have
been if the contract had been fully performed. 2 8  Therefore, since
Anelka was one of the top young strikers in the game, damages would
be measured by the amount it would cost to obtain a player of similar
ability. This was estimated to be close to twenty-two million pounds;
much more than the 900,000 pounds offered by Anelka for the buy-
out. 20 9 Finally, pro-contract supporters suggested that, if a player
wanted to have the option to break the contract in mid-stream, he was
free to insist on a buy-out clause in his contract, setting in advance a
specific mutually agreeable fee for a future transfer.
Significantly, Gordon Taylor of the players' association was con-
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cerned with the EC view that football players should be treated like
other workers within the EU.21 ° He believed that this view ignored foot-
ball's unique need to have a "long-term planning policy with young
players and stability to stop supporters getting disenchanted." 21 1 Taylor
also shared the fear of others that a transfer fee-free-market could back-
fire on players, allowing clubs to drop a player if he was injured, out of
shape, or not performing up to a satisfactory level. 2  Taylor suggested
instead the establishment of a single, month-long transfer window when
transfers of players under contract could occur.213 This limited transfer
ability, Taylor argued, would give the sport the necessary stability
needed for development and desired by the clubs and the fans. 2 14
Ultimately, Arsenal found a buyer for Anelka at their asking price
and transferred him to Real Madrid for twenty-three million pounds.21 5
Anelka, meanwhile, signed a contract with Real that paid him 50,000
pounds per week. 16 Judging by the numbers, neither Arsenal nor
Anelka lost out. The losers were the fans and the sport itself as the
ordeal demonstrated how both sides were controlled by the power of
money.
B. FIFA's Initial Reaction
In October 1999, FIFA unilaterally proposed changes to the transfer
system, which would determine a player's transfer fee by multiplying
the number of years left on his contract by his yearly salary.2 l7 Addi-
tionally, FIFA considered implementing a wage or salary cap limiting
the amount of money clubs could spend.21 8 The response from the
European football community was immediate and negative. 21 9 Once
again, many complaints focused on the potential hardship, or even
extinction, of smaller clubs, that would not even have the opportunity to
reap the benefit of developing a player by selling him to a larger club in
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the middle of his contract.22° Because the initial contract for a young,
developing player was never too high, the compensation fees would do
little to maintain the developmental system. Players who had been val-
ued by the British transfer tribunal at over one million pounds would
now be subject to low, proposed compensation payments-30,000
pounds for each year a developmental club had spent on a player.22" '
The players' associations believed that, while the free movement of
players had to be respected, there also had to be a way of shifting eco-
nomic resources to the smaller, developmental clubs to keep them in
business.2 2 2 For example, creating a common pool of money to dis-
tribute to these clubs would soften the blow to the youth developmental
system.223 Otherwise, if a club, could not count on receiving adequate
compensation for developing a player from a young age until his talent
and skill level had reached a point at which he could jump to a higher
division club, why would any club bother to do so?224
C. The Commission Applies Some Pressure
By May 2000, the EC, apparently displeased with FIFA's progress,
or lack thereof, in transfer system reform, announced plans to enact a
law that, if passed, would allow players to break their contracts upon one
month's notice to their clubs. 225 After giving the proper notice, a player
would be free to sign with any other club by paying off the remaining
value of his contract. 226 The EC gave FIFA and UEFA until September
to come up with an alternative to this plan. 227 The EC was also willing
to work out an arrangement for compensation to be paid to a club, based
on factors such as a player's age, his salary, and the amount of training
received from the club. It was not convinced, however, by pleas that
transfer fees were a form of compensation for training, remarking that
they "bear no relation to training costs of a player. '228 FIFA and UEFA
had to allow players to move freely without arbitrary figures preventing
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221. Id.
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them from doing SO. 2 2 9
D. FIFA and UEFA: A "United" Front?
As the football world sought to avoid the EC's proposed chaos-
inducing plan, FIFA and UEFA announced that the two governing orga-
nizations were "100 per cent united" against the EC's proposals.2 °
FIFA brazenly declared that it was unwilling to make concessions on
certain key issues, such as minimum duration of contracts and compen-
sation to clubs for training and developing young players. 31 Mean-
while, UEFA continued to push for an exemption based on the
specificity of sport, arguing that transfer fees were necessary in order to
keep the smaller clubs in existence.232 UEFA implored the EC not to
look merely at the million-dollar players. For every Ronaldo or Anelka,
there were hundreds of players toiling away for little money with lower
division teams, and dreaming of making it to the top. 233 Even FIFPro
expressed concern over the EC's proposals, arguing that they would dis-
mantle the foundation of the most popular sport in the world. 23 4
On August 31, 2000, FIFA president Sepp Blatter proposed scrap-
ping transfer fees for players under the age of eighteen and over the age
of twenty-four. 5 In order to avoid a "guillotine decision" by the EC
ending the entire transfer system, FIFA proposed that a "compensation
fee" be paid for the transfer of a player between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-four to protect the club that has developed and trained the
player 6.23  FIFA also called for a minimum one-year stay with a team to
prevent players from team-hopping throughout the season in search of
an ever increasing salary. 2 37 Further, FIFA suggested a narrow transfer
window during the season so that roster shifts would occur only once
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during a season.238
With this unilateral proposal, football's "united" front quickly
crumbled. UEFA immediately questioned the proposal and declared that
total agreement was lacking between the two organizations. 9 UEFA's
chief executive, Gerhard Aigner, publicly declared that FIFA had
jumped the gun and had announced its proposal without discussing it
with the European football community.24° Aigner's sentiments were
echoed by clubs throughout Europe as they asked why, without consult-
ing them, such an important decision was made by Blatter, a man far
removed from the people who actually took the economic risks involved
with signing players.24'
In Britain, officials of second-division clubs believed the proposals
to be the "death knell" of their existence. They doubted that the "vague"
training compensation would approach the amount previously received
from transfer fees or even be enough to keep their clubs above water.242
Even the manager of Britain's wealthiest club, Manchester United,
warned that the sport would hang itself with FIFA's proposals. The
sport would lose not only the smaller clubs, but also millions of fans as
club supporters would have difficulty following a team with a constantly
changing roster.243
Many critics accused FIFA of waving the White flag and admitting
that they were unable to control the economics of football.24  Others
questioned what these proposals would do to the stability and integrity
of the sport.245 For instance, a team with sufficient financial backing
could, after a poor season, ignore its player-development system and
avoid years of rebuilding by simply replacing the entire team with a new
one.
246
The EC, on the other hand, viewed this long-awaited response as a
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step in the right direction in that it demonstrated a willingness by FIFA
to negotiate.247 The EC also sought to pacify those in the football com-
munity who feared the total destruction of the transfer system. Viviane
Reding, the EU Commissioner for Education and Culture, stated that the
EC only wanted to ensure that the transfer rules respected both the laws
of the European Community and the specificity of sport. She also
pointed out that the EC fully supported the maintenance of some form of
compensation for training and a limited transfer period so that the free
movement of players would not disrupt the outcome of ongoing champi-
onships.248 Underlying Reding's statement was the sentiment that the
EC's threats were made to awaken FIFA to the fact that it must be ready
to negotiate changes to its transfer system or else its future would be left
in the hands of the commissioners. 24 9 The EC subsequently gave the
football authorities until the end of October to propose a system that
included specific models of compensation, prompting representatives of
FIFA, UEFA, FIFPro, and other national associations, to form a transfer
task force.2
E. UEFA Takes Charge
Following FIFA's bizarre surrender, the football world held its col-
lective breath. Transfers in Europe came to a standstill as players and
clubs awaited the outcome of the controversy. 25I Top coaches consid-
ered leaving the European game for the international level to avoid the
predicted chaos.25 2 In an effort to achieve a resolution, UEFA appealed
to the leaders of the fifteen EU Member States for a sporting exemption.
Meanwhile, the transfer task force continued its work on the proposals
for the end of October.2 5 3
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder gave football a ringing endorsement. They expressed their
concern that, while the existing form of the transfer system was not per-
fect, any radical changes made without the input of the players, clubs,
and associations could be devastating to the sport.2 54 Blair and Schroder
concluded:
The associations need planning and security for the promotion of
young soccer talent and the development of their teams. They need a
system that will ensure a healthy balance and fair opportunities for
everyone concerned. We hope that in the search for an arrangement
on the transfer system the Commission will take into account the spe-
cial situation that exists in professional soccer. 5
UEFA hoped that the European Council's December Meeting in
Nice would lead to a proposal acknowledging the unique status of the
sport, and ensure its future stability. 6 Special legal status within the
EU for sporting bodies, like UEFA and the national associations, would
force EU legislators to recognize their importance and their need to
establish rules to protect the stability and integrity of the sport.25 7
UEFA leaders believed this exemption would protect football, and sport
in general, from future legal challenges. 8
Meanwhile, the transfer task force continued drafting proposals that
could salvage the system that was a "vital part of the glue that holds the
game together. ' 259 Supporters continued to argue that the transfer sys-
tem had benefitted football in several ways, including the protection and
encouragement of development, solidarity in terms of financial redistri-
bution, and contract stability. 6 °
In drafting the proposals, the task force encountered the recurring
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problems of harmonizing proposed changes with the laws of each Mem-
ber State and achieving unanimity. A proposal to adopt a transfer sys-
tem similar to one used in Spain exemplified the problems with the
national laws.26' Under the Spanish transfer system, upon signing the
initial contract, the player and club agreed on a compensatory transfer
fee to be paid by a purchasing club.262 As a result, there were fewer
disputes over astronomical transfer fees, and because the player had
freely agreed to the terms of the contract, a club avoided accusations of
restricting player movement.263 When the task force looked at this sys-
tem, however, the British representatives argued that such a system
could not survive under English contract law, which prohibits penalty
clauses in contracts. An English court would likely view the compensa-
tion clause in the contract as a penalty clause and not as an actual fore-
cast of damages.2 64
In October, as it tried to finalize its proposals for the EC, divisive
cracks appeared within the task force when FIFPro's Gordon Taylor
openly expressed his disappointment with the progress toward a com-
promise.265 The disagreement focused on the compensation of players
over the age of twenty-three.266 FIFPro argued that compensation
should be based merely on the wages of the player and the value of the
remaining term of the contract (exactly what FIFA had proposed in
October 1999).267 The task force, led by UEFA and FIFA, believed that
other factors such as the cost of replacing the player and the loss of
merchandising, should be included as well. 268 Taylor accused the task
force of attempting to maintain the status quo of the transfer system
under the guise of "compensation," rather than fulfilling its mandate.269
Feeling that the task force had failed to consider the players'
demands, Taylor vowed to go to Brussels, where he would meet with the
EC solely on behalf of the players, armed with the assurance that the EC
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supported the involvement of the players' association in the task
force.27° Meanwhile, the football authorities continued with their plan to
present the task force proposals to the EC, although Blatter acknowl-
edged that doing so without the support of FIFPro was "like having your
body decapitated."27'
F. The Transfer Task Force Proposals
Under the cloud of controversy surrounding the quarrel between
FIFPro and FIFA, the transfer task force presented its proposals to the
EC on October 31, 2000.272 The proposals were based on five major
points.2 73 First, in an effort to protect vulnerable young players from
economic exploitation, the document proposed to prohibit international
transfers of players under the age of eighteen.274 Second, the proposals
called for the assessment of a "training compensation" on the transfer of
every player up to the completion of his training at the age of twenty-
three.2 75 This compensation would apply to the transfer of players both
in-contract and out-of-contract. 76
Third, the document emphasized the importance of a respect for
contracts in the relationship between the player, the club, and the pub-
lic. 277 In an effort to promote this stability of contract, the task force
proposed that any contract lasting up to three years must be respected by
both the player and the club.278 Under this same justification, the docu-
ment suggested the introduction of contracts with a maximum duration
of five years. 279 In other words, the task force proposed that five-year
contracts be issued-a player and his club would be forced to respect the
contract for the first three years, after which there could be unilateral
termination at any time.
Fourth, the document suggested limiting transfer periods to two
transfer windows during the year.280 Additionally, in order to quell the
fears that players would be constantly changing teams as they chased the
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highest salary, the proposal demanded the limitation of one transfer per
player each season. 281
Finally, the document called for the institution of an arbitration sys-
tem for cases where there was a breach of contract, no matter what the
age of the player.282 The arbitration system would use objective criteria
and take into account relevant principles of national labor law, to deter-
mine the amount of compensation to be paid in a given case.2 83 The
arbitration panel would also have the power to enforce disciplinary sanc-
tions in order to deter unethical behavior, such as a club causing the
breach of a player's contract with another club before the end of the
initial three-year period. 284 Additionally, hidden towards the end of the
arbitration section, is an opening for all parties involved, both clubs and
players, to agree to forego the arbitration panel and come up with their
own transfer fee. Essentially, it would allow transfer fees to remain high
in cases of "voluntary transfer. 285
FIFPro vehemently disagreed with the establishment of the three-
year period during which players could not obtain transfers; they argued
that players should be free to break their contracts after two years, at the
most, in order to allow for more freedom of movement.286 Additionally,
FIFPro objected to the vague reference to objective criteria that would
be used to calculate a compensation fee. It urged that the fee should be
based solely on the remaining value of the contract which would allow a
purchasing club to know in advance the cost of the transfer of a certain
player.287 The task force, on the other hand, believed that a readily cal-
culable transfer value for each player would only encourage a purchas-
ing club to induce a breach of a player's contract with his original club,
and therefore supported the use of objective criteria. 88
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G. Reaction to the Proposals
The EC's initial reactions to the task force proposals were not
encouraging for football's hopes of a quick resolution.2 89 First, the
Commission believed that the ban on transfers for players under eigh-
teen was an obstacle to free movement. The Commission urged the
football authorities to come up with a "code of conduct" for clubs to
follow with respect to juniors, rather than an outright ban, in order to
protect against abuses.2 9 ° The EC also expressed some doubts as to
whether a uniform compensation system for training would be possible
under the laws of the different Member States.291 Nevertheless, the EC
did support some kind of compensation for training,292 but wanted a
more detailed proposal on how this compensation system was to
work.293
At the same time, the EC continued to be very concerned with the
split within the task force and warned FIFA that a deal on the transfer
situation was very unlikely without the FIFPro's consent. 294 As a result,
the burden shifted to FIFA and UEFA to compromise with FIFPro in an
effort to bring about at least a faqade of unity for the negotiations with
the EC.
The EC was not the only group to criticize the transfer proposals.295
Smaller clubs argued that the proposed design dramatically favored
larger clubs, pointing out that for the transfer of players under twenty-
three, which was the kind of transfer most likely made by smaller, devel-
opmental clubs, compensation was to be based merely on the "costs of
training. '296 For transfers of players over twenty-three, on the other
hand, FIFA called for a complex formula that would help what was
likely to be a larger club get fully compensated for its loss, including
loss of merchandising. 297
The EC responded to these concerns by assuring the smaller clubs
that it was not interested in dismantling the transfer system completely
289. See Mihir Bose, FIFA's Transfer Blueprint Has Cool Welcome, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 1, 2000, at 44, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Stephen Castle, Football: 'Smaller Clubs Face Bankruptcy', THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 8, 2000, at 31, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
293. See Officials Slated to Meet, Talk Next Week, ESPN.com, Nov. 27, 2000, at http://espn.
go.com/soccer/news/2000/1127/906372.html (on file with author).
294. See European Transfer Deal Faces Obstacle, CBSSportsline.com, Nov. 6, 2000, at http://
cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0, 1169,29872405,00.html (on file with author).
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within a single Member State, since the EC believed that most of the
transfers from smaller clubs took place intrastate. 298 The problems of
national transfers, the EC declared, were between the national govern-
ment and the national football association. 99 While this declaration was
intended to calm the nerves of many small clubs' chairmen, its effect
missed the mark. Angry lower division clubs pointed out that the exclu-
sion of domestic transfers from the reforms would do little to save the
smaller clubs for two reasons. 300 First, a player who desired to move
from one club to another within the same league would be able to bypass
the domestic transfer system by signing a short-term contract with a club
outside the Member State and then subsequently transferring to the
desired club in the original Member State for no fee at all.3 °1 Second,
larger clubs might decide to save money and obtain transfers from other
Member States where a player could be obtained by simply paying the
remainder of his contract.302 As a result, smaller British clubs faced
extinction, even though the domestic transfer system and its larger fees
might still be technically available. Perhaps this was one reason why the
national associations were expected to implement whatever rules were
ultimately agreed upon between the EC and FIFA for domestic transfers
as well.30 3
G. Declaration from the European Council Meeting in Nice
As negotiations continued between the EC and the transfer task
force, FIFA and UEFA carried on their efforts to obtain a declaration
from the leaders of the Member States on the distinct status of sport
within the laws of the EU.304 FIFA proposed a declaration that, at a
minimum, called for an agreement between the sporting federations and
EU legislators that sporting employment contracts had to be regulated
"in line with the specific needs of sport and respecting national and EU
law."30 5 FIFA claimed it was not seeking an exemption that would
enable football to live outside the rules of the EU. It argued that it only
298. Castle, supra note 292, at 31.
299. Mihir Bose, EU Will Not Outlaw British Transfer System, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 2, 2000, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
300. Football: Transfers: 'Young Stars Will Be Lost', BIRMINGHAM EVENING MAIL, Dec. 5,
2000, at 47, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. Matt Dickinson, Task Force Secures Concessions in Transfer Discussions, THE TIMES,
(London) Dec. 18, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
304. See Michael Mann, EU States Close to Agreements on Sports Declaration, FIFA.com,
Nov. 7, 2000, at http://www.fifa.com/reuters/00-11/2000-11-07_18578_E.html (on file with
author).
305. Id.
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wanted an acknowledgement that FIFA need not blindly adhere to the
laws of the EU no matter the consequences to the sport.30 6
At the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000,
largely through the efforts of Tony Blair, the Council issued a declara-
tion supporting the right of sporting federations to independent self-
organization while still respecting national and EU law.30 7 The declara-
tion emphasized that the federations were best able to take note of devel-
opments in the sporting world and thereby alter regulations in an effort
to guarantee "sporting cohesion and participatory democracy. "308
Finally, the Council mentioned the transfer situation specifically and
urged the groups to continue to work towards an agreement that had
"due regard for the specific requirements of sport.
30 9
While the Council declaration did not take sides on the transfer
issue, football supporters viewed it as a "step forward" in the campaign
to protect some remnant of the transfer system. 3 ° The actual effect of
the declaration was to put more pressure on both the EC and the football
authorities to come to an agreement.31 For the EC, the declaration was
an irritation since it had been calling for negotiations with the football
authorities for over two years and had taken its hard-line approach only
after FIFA continually failed to propose any viable changes.312
I. Negotiations
As negotiations between the football authorities and the EC
stretched into December 2000, progress was apparent and points on
which both sides were finally able to agree began to appear.31 3 The
Commission agreed that a compensation fee for training would be
acceptable if it was based on the amount of time spent training with the
club, the market value of the player, and the remainder of the con-
tract. 314 The EC also supported the use of an independent arbitration
306. See FIFA Reiterates Call for Special Status for Sport, FIFA.com, Dec. 6, 2000, at http://
www.fifa2.com/scripts/runisa.dll?M2:gp::67173rel/Display+19643+E (on file with the author).
307. See EU Council Declaration on the Specific Characteristics of Sport and its Social
Function in Europe, of Which Account Should Be Taken in Implementing Common Policies, (Dec.
2000) at 1, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/sport/doc/ecouncil/a_doc-en.html (on file with author).
308. Id. at 2.
309. Id. at 3.
310. See Andrew Grice, Nice Summit: Britain and Germany Block Football Reform; Transfer
Deals, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 9, 2000, at 4, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News
File.
311. Catherine MacLeod and William Tinning, Football Transfer Fees Win Reprieve from EU,
THE HERALD (Glasgow), Dec. 9, 2000, at 4, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
312. See id.
313. See Vivek Chaudhary, Football: EU Gives All-Clear to British Transfers, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 2, 2000, at 2, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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panel in cases where there was a dispute as to a player's value.315 Addi-
tionally, the EC indicated that it was prepared to accept the notion of
limited transfer windows in order to preserve equality among the clubs
during the course of a season or championship.316 One of the EC's pri-
mary concerns was the compensation system proposed by FIFA for costs
other than training.3" 7 The EC declared that if such fees were estab-
lished between club and player according to national law (and did not
involve FIFA at all), then the EC's enforcement powers could not reach
these fees.318 If FIFA continued to govern the transfer system, however,
then FIFA would have to clarify the objective criteria that it planned to
use to calculate the fee and make sure it conformed to EU law.3 19
In the wake of the Council's declaration on sport, further negotia-
tions in December produced several more important compromises.32 °
First, the EC indicated that it was willing to accept the ban on transfers
of players aged sixteen and below since minors at that age could not be
considered "workers."32' It was also agreed that players should not be
able to change clubs more than once a year.322 Additionally, a FIFA
proposal that each club involved in the training of a player would be
compensated, thereby recognizing the efforts of all clubs with whom a
developing player had spent time, was accepted.323 Under the agreed-
upon proposal, the original club would be able to obtain a percentage of
any transfer fee for a player throughout his career, giving that club a
reward for its work and an incentive to continue to develop young
talent.324
Surprisingly, the EC also showed a willingness to reverse Bosman
for players under twenty-three.325 Under the preliminary agreement, a
club would receive compensation for training upon the transfer of a
player under the age of twenty-three, no matter whether the player was
315. Id.
316. See Martin Lipton, Premier League Scoffs as Eurocrat Promises an End to the Transfer
Row, DAILY MAIL (London), Dec. 2, 2000, at 92, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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325. See id. See also Dickinson, supra note 303.
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under contract or out-of-contract. 6 The EC's concession on Bosman
did have limitations. The selling club had the burden of demonstrating
that it had been "substantially involved" in the development of the
player.327 In addition, the amount paid to a club that was able to satisfy
this burden of proof would be determined by objective criteria, such as
the length of time the player had spent with the club.328
While constant bickering between UEFA and FIFA hampered pro-
gress, there was a larger obstacle in the way of any agreement between
the EC and football - the lack of assent by FIFPro to many of the
compromises. 329 The players' union continued to dispute the calculation
of compensation for transfers of players over twenty-three based on
objective criteria,33° instead calling for compensation based purely on a
player's salary. 33 1 FIFPro also began to push the EC to enforce the stan-
dard three-month notice period used by other EU workers for ending a
contract. 332 The on-going feud between FIFPro and the rest of the foot-
ball hierarchy was a thorn in the side of the EC, as well, because FIF-
Pro's complaints made it difficult for the Commission to ignore that the
FIFA/UEFA proposals would continue to restrict the players' freedom
of movement.333 FIFPro and the EC agreed that the mandatory three-
year term was too restrictive. 334 The EC believed that such a term
would be a "blatant" violation of the freedom of movement and would
be impossible to defend if a player brought a court action challenging
the system.335 As negotiations stretched into January 2001, UEFA and
FIFA vowed to continue to fight for the concept of a mandatory three-
year contract period, despite the united EC/FIFPro front on this issue.33 6
J. 2001: A Year for Compromise?
Heading into 2001, there was some feeling among the football
authorities that much of the danger to the transfer system had been
326. See Stewart, supra note 324, at 1.
327. Dickinson, supra note 303.
328. Id.
329. See FIFA and EU Ready to Iron Out Transfer Contretemps, AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE,
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averted and that the system would be preserved in some form.337 On
January 10, 2001, FIFA announced that it had sent new proposals to
UEFA, FIFPro, and the EC in advance of the negotiation session sched-
uled for two days later.338 The delivery of these proposals to UEFA
crushed the high spirits from the December negotiations, and division
within the ranks of the football family returned.
339
The most controversial aspect of FIFA's proposals was a "just
sporting cause" provision. Under this provision, a player could break
his contract with his club with three months notice if he disagreed with
the coaching tactics of his manager.340 For example, Nicolas Anelka
could have avoided his campaign for a transfer by merely giving Arsenal
three month's notice of his departure and stating he disagreed with his
manager's strategy. Additionally, the proposals allowed for a player to
walk out on his contract if his club was "relegated" to a lower division
because of a poor record the prior season, despite the fact that the team's
record and the player's performance were inherently linked.34'
In submitting these proposals, FIFA claimed that they were based
on the transfer task force's proposals from the previous October, but also
took into account all of the subsequent negotiation meetings.342 FIFA
proclaimed that it continued in its efforts to "salvage" the transfer sys-
tem by suggesting a "different strategy" for accomplishing the agreed-
upon goals of the football family.3 43
The proposal stunned UEFA and its members.344 Initial reactions
from UEFA, similar to those from the previous autumn, accused FIFA
of caving to the combined pressure of the EC and FIFPro.345 One
incredulous British football official stated that FIFA was suffering from
"a severe dose of mad cow disease" if it really believed that it could
make such proposals "without the consent of its most powerful confed-
337. See Transfer System Talks on Hold, CNNSI.com, Jan. 10, 2001, at http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/2001/01/10/fifatransfers/index.html (on file with author).
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eration [UEFA]. ' '346 Others were amazed that the same organization
that had wasted over a year in responding to the threats of the EC was
now arrogantly going over the head of its most senior member in sub-
mitting the "flawed" proposals.347
UEFA immediately demanded that FIFA withdraw the proposals,
notify the EC that the proposals were unofficial, and consult UEFA on
all future proposals.348 At the same time, UEFA prepared to take its
own arguments to the Commission.349 Because the EC dealt officially
only with FIFA during transfer negotiations, in order to meet separately
with the Commission, UEFA would have to make a formal intervention
and register itself as an interested party.35° In doing so, UEFA believed
that it would represent the best interests of "the whole of European foot-
ball," rather than the separate interests of factions within the sport.5 In
UEFA's view the transfer battle with the EC was of greater concern to
the European clubs and leagues than to the rest of the football world, and
as the representative of the interested parties, it should take the lead in
these negotiations. 352 Finally, UEFA officials also threatened to "press
the 'nuclear button"' by breaking away from FIFA.353 This threat was a
serious one for FIFA because of the political and financial power of
UEFA.3 54 Such a breakaway would result in the absence of any Euro-
pean teams in the FIFA-sponsored World Cup, something that would
hurt both FIFA's popularity and the integrity of the competition.
To some, this latest problem represented the "final straw" in a
tumultuous, unhappy relationship because of UEFA's decreasing power
within a globally expanding FIFA.355 Also resurfacing during this pub-
lic conflict was the "mutual loathing" between FIFA President Sepp
Blatter and UEFA President Lennart Johansson.356 The personal feud
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between the two men started in 1998 when Blatter defeated Johansson in
the election for FIFA President, using the scheduling of a future World
Cup in Africa as one of his campaign promises.3 7 In 2000, however,
Johansson was able to garner enough votes among FIFA members to
allow Germany to win the bid to host the 2006 World Cup.358 Because
of this devastating defeat for Blatter and his candidate to host the tourna-
ment, South Africa, many viewed FIFA's submission of its own propos-
als as Blatter's personal revenge and an attempt to remind UEFA that it
was merely a part of the whole.3 5 9 UEFA's threats of secession, how-
ever, forced FIFA to realize that a FIFA without UEFA was "like the
Roman Empire without Rome. 36 °
According to UEFA, the FIFA proposals weakened two key princi-
ples: (1) contract stability; and (2) establishment of a feasible compensa-
tion system.361 With players' possessing the ability to leave clubs and
clubs able to terminate player's with little notice, any notion of stability
of contracts would be tossed aside under FIFA's proposals.362 UEFA
believed that FIFA was only considering the players' point of view and
was largely ignoring the clubs who provided the stage and the fans who
packed the theatre to see the players perform.36 3 The only clubs that
benefited from FIFA's proposals were the wealthier clubs who would
draw players away from smaller clubs with the promise of riches. These
large, wealthy clubs would only be forced to wait for three months after
a player gave his notice. 364 UEFA firmly believed that fixed-term con-
tracts and an arbitration panel to assess damages were the appropriate
solution to this problem. This solution would allow respect of contracts
as well as permit free movement.365 FIFA's proposals were difficult to
comprehend for adherents to the principle of contract stability because
players entered into these contracts willingly for a mutually-agreed
Deep-seated Problems Between FIFA and UEFA Are at the Root of the Transfer System Dispute,
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term.366 Yet, the "just sporting cause" provision would allow players to
breach these same contracts merely because there was disagreement
with the manager's coaching style.36 7
Ultimately, FIFA backed down. It agreed to withdraw the propos-
als 368 and to accept certain principles, most significantly, fixed-term
contracts and an arbitration panel for determining payments. 369 There-
fore, the dyke had once again been plugged, at least for the time being.
While UEFA and FIFA settled their family squabble, the EC
patiently waited, though insiders hinted that an agreement maintaining
much of the appearance of the present system was available to foot-
ball.37° As it became more aware of the views of grass-roots campaigns
throughout Europe, the Commission became more inclined to listen to
the views of UEFA since they were more representative of local inter-
ests.371 Sources within the EC hinted that the Commission might accept
the Spanish system of stipulating to transfer fees when negotiating a
contract.372 With respect to the problem of dealing with different
national laws on this issue, EC sources pointed to the possibility of an
agreement among all football authorities (including the players) that
such a system would not be challenged.373 It was rumored the EC would
look more favorably on this system because it would allow a player to
have an opportunity to decide when he could move, rather than leaving
this power solely with the club.37 4
For FIFA and UEFA (and, for that matter, Blatter and Johansson),
time was running out and differences had to be put aside.375 Both sides
vowed to work together, "hand-in-hand," and called for the reinstate-
ment of the transfer task force in order to create mutually agreeable pro-
posals for the EC.376 Significantly, there was no representative of
FIFPro included in the revived task force.377 The quick healing process
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and the absence of FIFPro from the task force caused one critic to call
the FIFA withdrawal of its proposals "simply papering over the
cracks.378
Nevertheless, as the united FIFAIUEFA front and the EC prepared
to meet in late January, there was a feeling on both sides that a deal was
imminent. 37 9 The largest remaining obstacle was agreement on contract
duration-the football authorities continued to call for mandatory three-
year contracts while the EC found this to be an excessive restriction on a
player's movement. 38" Additionally, the two sides remained deadlocked
on the issues of how much notice a player was required to give his club
before terminating his contract and what compensation system would
govern these terminations. 38 1 The EC continued, however, to urge FIFA
and UEFA to seek a compromise with FIFPro, a deal considered by
most to be absolutely necessary to any final agreement with the EC.382
Numerous legal challenges to the transfer system presently working
their way through the national courts loomed ahead for the football
authorities.383 One case pending before the ECJ involved a Hungarian
player, Tibor Balog, who questioned the legal implications of the trans-
fer system on players from nations with special trade links with the
EU.3 84 Because this case involved both a freedom of movement claim
as well as a competition claim, FIFA and UEFA feared an ECJ decision
on competition grounds that would invoke the enforcement powers of
the EC, completing what Bosman left unfinished.385
In addition, the growing power of sports agents under a new system
with greater player movement concerned football authorities. There was
a strong fear that agents, eager to garner greater commissions, would
encourage players to break their contracts.386 In an effort to prevent this
threat, the British Football Association (FA) proposed to establish itself
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as a "clearing house" for domestic transfer monies that would investi-
gate whether the deal was done properly before passing on the transfer
money.387 In the case of international transfers, the FA encouraged
UEFA or FIFA to set up a similar system.388
Eventually, the EC's patience began to wear thin with the progress
of the negotiations, and the Commission became concerned that there
was a certain amount of stonewalling on the part of the task force.3 89 In
an effort to regain the momentum from talks before the New Year, the
EC proposed to meet with Blatter and Johansson as part of an informal
transfer summit during which the two sides could discuss proposals with
an eye towards finalizing a deal at a meeting to be held February 16
2001.39° The EC viewed the summit as the "last chance" for football to
settle the transfer issue, and it urged the task force to find a common
ground with FIFPro, reminding the football authorities of the upcoming
litigation concerning the transfer system.39 1
As the task force prepared for the summit, a new controversial pro-
posal emerged - certain "sporting" sanctions on both the breaching
player and the purchasing club - when a player broke his contract to
sign with another club without permission of his current club.3 92 A
player who breached could be suspended for six to twelve months,
depending on the severity of the breach and the remaining term of his
playing contract. 39 3 A club found to have induced a breach could be
prevented from transferring any more players for six to twelve
months.394 UEFA stressed that a player, club, or third-party (such as an
agent) causing the breach of a playing contract was committing a dis-
loyal and unsporting act that should result in "strong disciplinary sanc-
tions. '395  Additionally, UEFA urged that, when possible, player
movement should be the result of "amicable agreement between all
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395. See UEFA Committee Outline Key Principles for International Transfer System,
UEFA.com, Feb. 5, 2001, at http://www.uefa.com/newsdata/uefa/news/indexp.asp?news=9011
(on file with author).
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parties. 396
When FIFPro accepted that stability of contract was essential for
the survival of the sport, and backed down on its demand for a three-
month notice period,397 the remaining points of contention between the
two sides were the length of the protected period of a contract and the
severity of the sporting sanctions.39 8 With the gap significantly nar-
rowed between F1FA/UEFA and FIFPro, officials were optimistic that
an agreement on the proposals would be reached between the two sides
before submitting them to the EC at the February 16, 2001 meeting.399
Any air of compromise and optimism collapsed once again, how-
ever, at an official meeting between FIFA, UEFA, and FIFPro, just two
days before a Valentine's Day summit with the EC. 4° After a lengthy
argument with football officials, FIFPro Vice President Phillipe Piat
walked out of the meeting, claiming that FIFA and UEFA demanded
that a player honor the length of his contract, while preserving the right
of a club to sell the player at any time. °1 Despite another breakdown
within the dysfunctional football family, the Commission met with the
leaders of FIFA and UEFA on February 14, 2001, with the hope that
face-to-face discussions would help to create an atmosphere more con-
ducive to compromise.40 2
Following the Valentine's Day summit, the Commissioners and the
football officials released a joint statement indicating that the two sides
had "cemented an agreement on significant number of issues. 40 3 The
joint statement declared that the two sides had agreed on: (1) establish-
ment of fixed transfer periods; (2) minimum and maximum terms of
contracts of one and five years; (3) creation of a solidarity mechanism
that would distribute funds to smaller clubs; (4) establishment of an
396. Id.
397. Steve Curry, Transfers: Taylor Talks of United Front. ESPN.com, Feb. 7, 2001, at http://
www.soccernet.com/europe/new/2001/0207/20010207eufifataylor.html (on file with author).
398. See Peter Starck, FIFA Repeats Call for Maximum of One Move a Year, ESPN.com, Feb.
6, 2001, at http://www.soccemet.com/europe/news/2001/0206/2000l206transferfifa.html (on file
with author); Copeman, supra note 393, at 2.
399. Soccer Heads Are Optimistic About Agreement on Transfer Dispute, CBSSportsline.com,
Feb. 6, 2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0, I 169,34753455,00.html (on file with
author).
400. See Players' Representatives Walk Out of Transfers Meetings, CBSSportsline.com, Feb.
12, 2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wires/stories/o,1 169,35029585,00.html (on file with
author).
401. Union in Transfer Talks Walk-Out, ESPN.com, Feb. 12, 2001, at http://www.soccemet.
com/europe/news/2001/0212/20010212uniontransfers.html (on file with author).
402. See EU Soccer Chiefs Set for 'Summit', ESPN.com, Feb. 13, 2001, at http://
www.soccernet.com/europe/news/2001/0213/20010213eurotransfers.html (on file with author).
403. Martyn Ziegler, Football's Big Two Reach 'Historic' Transfer Agreement, ESPN.coM,
Feb. 14, 2001, available at http://www.soccemet.com/england/news/2001/0214/20010214transfer
historic.html.
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independent arbitration panel with recourse to the national courts; and
(5) compensation for training and development.4 °4
Three issues remained for the two sides to work out: (a) protecting
young players; (b) dealing with unilateral termination of contracts; and
(c) calculating the training fees.4 °5 The EC agreed with the concept of
"proportionate" sporting sanctions in the case of an unilateral breach,
but found the one-year sanctions to be excessive.40 6 Additionally, the
Commission stressed that the training fees had to reflect actual training
costs in order to avoid "disproportionate" fees that would serve as an
obstacle to the movement of young players.40 7
In contrast to the high spirits of those who attended the Valentine's
Day summit, FIFPro remained critical of the results of this allegedly
"historic" day.408 Gordon Taylor alleged that all of the points of agree-
ment between the two sides were mere "rubber stamp[ing]" of previous
agreements.40 9 He pointed to the scheduling of further talks as evidence
of lingering discord.
While certain sources within football called FIFPro's criticism of
the agreement "sour grapes" because of the organization's exclusion
from the summit,4"0 there was genuine concern among football officials
that an agreement without FIFPro would lead to legal challenges by
players in the national courts.4 ' Others feared that the EC, with the
absence of FIFPro, would lose confidence in the negotiations and decide
to implement its own solution without any outside input.4" 2
FIFPro refused to agree with the task force's proposals and, instead,
submitted its own proposals to the Commission.413 Gordon Taylor fore-
cast a return to the "Dark Ages" under the FIFA/UEFA proposals and
publicly threatened to take the governing bodies to court in every coun-
404. Joint Statement by Commissioners Monti, Reding and Diamantopoulou and Presidents of
FIFA Blatter and of UEFA Johansson, UEFA.com, Feb. 14, 2001, at http://uefa.comIUEFA/news/
index.asp?News=9142 (on file with author).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See Harry Harris, Rescued; Risdale: All our Dreams Would Have Been Destroyed Without
this Transfer Peace Deal, THE MIRROR, Feb. 15, 2001, at 65, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
News File.
409. Id.
410. Martin Lipton, Taylor: No Transfer Peace - Yet, ESPN.com, Feb. 15, 2001, at http://
www.soccernet.com/england/news/2001/0215/20010215transferstaylor.html (on file with author).
411. See David Bond, Transfer Rulings Hit Further Snags, ESPN.com, Feb. 15, 2001, at http://
www.soccemet.com/england/news/2001/0215/20010215transfersnag.html (on file with author).
412. See Nick Harris, Players 'Not Told' of EC Essentials on Transfers, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 14, 2001, at 26, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
413. No Compromise: Soccer Officials Try to Reconcile Contracts Issue, CNNSI.com, Feb. 16,
2001, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/2001/02/16/fifa-eu-transfer/index.html (on
file with author).
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try if they refused to change their stance.414 FIFPro's proposals, among
other things, called for at least ten percent of transfer fees to go to soli-
darity pool systems, arbitration with equal representation for players and
clubs, mandatory three-year terms up to age twenty-three and two-year
terms thereafter, and no sanctions in cases of unilateral breach.4 15
Viewing FIFA/UEFA as the party most willing to compromise, the
EC appeared willing to accept the notion of an agreement without the
presence of FIFPro.4 16 UEFA accused FLFPro of trying to disrupt the
negotiations with the EC, but vowed that the disruptions and threats
would not prevent a final resolution.417 Additionally, UEFA questioned
whether FIFPro was truly representing the best interests of players
throughout Europe.4 18 Other league and club executives quickly fol-
lowed suit, accusing Taylor of constantly shifting his views and having
lost touch with the players.419 Some British officials went so far as to
say that few players in England had ever heard of FIFPro or Gordon
Taylor.42° This accusation was strengthened by a letter from a rival
players' union, ProProf, that declared that FIFPro was not the universal
representative of all players.42" '
Heading into March 2001 meetings with FIFA/UEFA, EC repre-
sentatives were cautiously optimistic,4 22 while FIFA and UEFA warned
that no further compromise was available on the remaining issues of
length of sporting sanctions and amount of compensation for training
players aged twenty-three and under.42 3 UEFA went as far as to send a
letter to Goran Persson, the prime minister of Sweden and current holder
of the rotating EU presidency, complaining that Commission officials
were "almost impossible to deal with," in part because of a "total lack of
understanding of how the development of players takes place. '4 24 Addi-
414. Soccer - World Soccer Faces Total Chaos Warns FIFPro, CBSSportsline.com, Feb. 16,
2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wires/stories/0,1169,3524461_5,00.html (on file with author).
415. Id.
416. No Compromise, supra note 413.
417. UEFA Defends Transfer Negotiation Process, UEFA.com, Feb. 17, 2001, at http://
www.uefa.com/uefa/nes/index.asp?news=9174 (on file with author).
418. Id.
419. Simon Hart and Andrew Warshaw, Soccer Chiefs Declare War on Taylor the Players'
Union Boss Is Branded a 'Hypocrite' as the Transfer Row Escalates, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 18, 2001, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See EC Commissioners Hopes to Strike New Transfer Deal, CBSSportsline.com, Feb. 26,
2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.comlu/wire/stories/o,l 169,35718095,00.html (on file with author).
423. Vivek Chaudhary and Jon Brodkin, Transfer Talks in Deadlock, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 3, 2001, at 2, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
424. Matthew Garrahan, Deborah Hargreaves, and David Owen, Brussels Warned on Football
Transfers, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2001, at 6, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News
File.
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tionally, UEFA believed that the Commission officials were "out of
touch and out of sympathy with the expressed wishes of governments of
their own member states and the recent Declaration on Sport from the
Nice Summit." '425 Persson's responded by urging both sides to "go the
extra mile" in order to "arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. 42 6
The subsequent meeting finally resulted in an agreement on a new
transfer system that satisfied the EC's demands.427 FIFA and UEFA
agreed to implement the changes for the following season after accept-
ance by FIFA's executive at a July 5, 2001 congress.428 As for the two
contentious issues, under the new system: (1) in the case of a transfer of
a player under the age of twenty-three, compensation for training would
be provided, even if the player was at the end of his contract with that
club; and (2) in the case of a unilateral breach by a player, the player
would not be able to play for another club during that season (if the
breach was made in the middle of a season) or for the first four months
of the next season. 29 Also significant was the fact that "amicable trans-
fers," where the two clubs and player agreed on terms, would not be
affected by the new transfer system.43°
Football's representatives proclaimed that the new system would
set a solid foundation for the sport's future.4 31  Additionally, FIFA/
UEFA promised more talks with the players, acknowledging that they
were a key ingredient for the future.432 The EC proclaimed that this was
the sort of agreement that it had sought from the beginning, stressing
that it never intended to treat footballers and clubs like the traditional
425. Martyn Ziegler, UEFA Fears for Future as Transfer Talks Hit Impasse, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 3, 2001, at 26, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
426. Soccer - Swedish PM Urges Big Push for Transfer Deal, CBSSportsline.com, Mar. 5,
2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0,l 169,36064855,00.html (on file with author).
427. Done Deal: EU, Soccer Bodies Agree on New Transfer System, CNNSI.com, Mar. 5,
2001, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.comsoccer/news/2001/03/05/transferagreement (on file with
author).
428. Transfer Negotiations Finished - The Key Elements, UEFA.com, (Mar. 5, 2001), at http://
www.uefa.com/uefa/news/print.asp?News=9396 (on file with author).
429. Transfers: How the New. System Works, ESPN.com, Mar. 6, 2001, at http://
www.soccemet.com/europe/news/2001/0306/20010306trasnfersystem.html (on file with author).
430. David Owen, Football Bodies Seek Sports Protocol; Club Management Call for Special
Needs to Be Recognized and for Protection from EU Treaties, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar.
12, 2001, at 10, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
431. Done Deal, supra note 427. Additionally, immediately following the agreement, the ECJ
dismissed the Tibor Balog case due to the language of the preamble of the transfer agreement
which stated that all players could move throughout the world at the end of a playing contract,
subject only to training compensation. Agreement Reached Between FIFA and Tibor Balog on 28
March 2001, FIFA.com, (Mar. 28, 2001), at http://www.fifa.com/Service/MRA/23432_E.html
(on file with author).
432. See id.
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employee-employer relationship.433 To do so, the EC stated, would
have destroyed the sport and ignored the "specific characteristics of
sport." '4 34 The president of the EC characterized the agreement as a
proper balance between the needs of sport and community law.435
FIFPro immediately voiced its protest of the agreement, calling it a
"very black day for European sport and footballers" and immediately
began planning legal actions.436 Representatives were quick to point out
that the agreement put footballers in a different category from other EU
workers and, thus, stripped them of equal social protection.437 Arguing
that any sporting sanctions (i.e. suspensions) were excessive because of
the already average short span of a football career, FIFPro believed that
there was no other answer but to pursue legal action in the fall once the
new rules were implemented against the EC.438
As the details of the agreement spread, differing reactions from the
football world emerged. In Britain, some club executives worried that
the new system would allow players to leave "at the drop of a wallet. 439
Clubs could not see the utility of a system that allowed a player to leave
in the middle of a contract and that forced a club to re-negotiate at the
whim of the player." 0 Many foresaw the use of "golden handcuff' pay-
ments by clubs in order to purchase the loyalty of a player."' There was
also a fear that, without such payments, the "four month rule" would
become the transfer rule as players would be aware that they could
change clubs simply by giving notice at the end of one season and sitting
433. Transfer Deal Cements Sport's Special Status Within EU, CBSSportlsine.com, Mar. 6,
2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0,1 169,3611791_5,00.html (on file with author).
434. Id.
435. EU Chief Congratulates on Soccer Transfer Deal, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 7, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
436. Ian Geoghegan, Players Unhappy as Transfer Deal is Agreed, ESPN.com, Mar. 5, 2001,
at http://www.soccernet.com/europe/news/2001/0305/2001O305transfersagasolved.html (on file
with author).
437. David Bond, Players Will Move 'At the Drop of a Wallet', ESPN.com, Mar. 6, 2001, at
http://www.soccernet.com/europe/news/2001.0306/2001O306transferdein.html (on file with
author).
438. FIFPro Set to Take EU to Court over Transfer Deal, CBSSportsline.com, Mar. 7, 2001,
at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0, 1169,3616187_5,00.html (on file with author); Paul
Goulding and Brian Kennelly, Players' Union Aims for an Injury-Time Equaliser, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 13, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
439. Nick Harris, New Transfer System 'Threatens Stability' of Game; Arsenal Vice-Chairman
David Dein Warns that Clubs Will Be Held to Ransom as International Players' Union Considers
Taking Legal Action, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 7, 2001, at 28, LEXIS, News Library,
Non-US News File.
440. See id.
441. Matt Dickinson, Disgruntled Players Pose Threat to Transfer Accord, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 7, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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out the first four months of the next season.44 ' Additionally, British
clubs were extremely concerned with the imposition of the transfer win-
dows - a concept foreign to the freewheeling style of transfers in Brit-
ish football.44 3 With transfers only limited to two windows each year,
smaller clubs voiced concerns that they might be unable to field enough
players during the season in case of injuries or suspensions. 4  In order
to avoid these damaging effects, it was hoped that the new transfer sys-
tem would only affect cross-border transfers and not domestic
transfers.445
Some even wondered whether the players' lot had been improved
under the new agreement, since clubs now would certainly not be offer-
ing long-term deals beyond two or three years to its players.446 While
top players might benefit from the ability to increase their salary more
often, the average player would now have less contractual stability and
would face greater pressure to succeed.4 47 Even top clubs such as
Manchester United admitted that, under this new system, players under
the age of twenty-eight would be in more demand because of the longer
period of contract protection.448 In general, an air of uncertainty hung
over the transfer agreement and its future. As a result, many clubs
refrained from active participation in the transfer market.449
As FIFA prepared to present the new transfer regulations to its
members on July 5, 2001, FIFPro began its legal challenges against the
new system. It started with an attempt to seek an injunction from the
Court of First Instance in Brussels to enjoin FIFA from implementing
the changes.45 ° With arguments before the court set for late July, FIFPro
442. Wenger Fears for Football Following New Transfer Deal, CBSSportsline.com, Mar. 6,
2001, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0,1 169,3612702_5,00.html (on file with author).
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TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 7, 2001, at 43, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
444. John Richardson, As Big Clubs Take Action to Protect Themselves Against Changes in the
Transfer System, the Minnows Fear They Will Be Left High and Dry; Moving the Goal Posts,
SUNDAY EXPRESS, Mar. 11, 2001, at 96, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
445. Simon Hart, Battle Looms over Transfer Windows, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar.
11, 2001, at 10, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
446. Charlie Nicholas, The Wrong Move, UEFA: Celtic Legend Says Euro Plan for New
Transfer Deal Could Mean the Rich Players Getting Richer and the Rest Left to Struggle,
EVENING TIMES (Glasgow), Mar. 9, 2001, at 76, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
447. See id.
448. Steve Bates, Rivaldo's Too Old for United, THE PEOPLE, Apr. 22, 2001, at 56-57, LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US News File.
449. Soccer - Newcastle Rule out Transfer Plunge, CBSSportsline.com, Apr. 5, 2001, at http.//
cbs.sportsline.com/u/wire/stories/0,1 169,3743640_5,00.html (on file with author). See also Darryl
Broadfoot, Summer Signing Slow Down; With the Expected Old Firm Transfer Boom Still to Take
Place, THE HERALD (Glasgow), June 19, 2001, at 31, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
[Vol. 56:667
EUROPEAN FOOTBALL'S TRANSFER SYSTEM
hoped that FIFA would not finalize the new regulations until after the
hearing. 451 At the July 5, 2001 Congress, however, FIFA adopted the
new transfer regulations and announced that the changes would be
implemented by September.452
K. The New Transfer Regulations
The following is a summary of the key points of the new transfer
regulations.
0 Contracts will have a minimum duration of one year and a maxi-
mum duration of five years.4 53
* Transfers will be limited to two transfer windows during the year
set by the national association, and a player may only be transferred
once in a single season.4 54 The longer transfer window is to take place
in the summer, before the start of the new season; the shorter window
will be at an appointed time mid-season and will be limited to transfers
"for strictly sport-related reasons, such as technical adjustments to a
team or the replacement of injured players, or in exceptional
circumstances. 455
* In an effort to protect players under the age of eighteen, transfers
of such players will only be permitted if the player's family moves to the
country where the new club is located "for reasons that are not linked to
football. '456 Additionally, FIFA and UEFA will adopt a "code of con-
duct" that governs the sports training and academic education of these
players in the case of a transfer within the EU.457
a For training compensation, a club will be compensated for the
training and education of a player each time a player is transferred until
his training is complete or he turns twenty-three, whichever is first.458
Calculation of the compensation is computed according to the category
of the club, which is determined by the quality of the training center and
451. See id.
452. New Transfer System Set for September, CNNSI.com, July 5, 2001, at http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/2001/07/05/fifatransfers (on file with author).
Additionally, the regulations would be subject to review after two years. FIFA Executive
Committee Formally Approves New International Transfer Regulations, FIFA.com, at http://
www.fifa.com/Service/MR_A/27416_E.html (on file with author).
453. FIFA, FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players Ch. 1, art. 4(2) (July 5,
2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter FIFA Regulations].
454. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 3, art. 5(2).
455. Regulations Governing the Application of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of
Players, Ch. 1, art. 2 [hereinafter Application of Regulations].
456. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 6, art. 12(1)(a).
457. Application of Regulations, supra note 455, Ch. 2, art. 3(1).
458. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 7, art. 15.
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the level of the training club. 59 In an effort to protect the smaller clubs,
compensation will be higher for a lower level club transferring a player
to a higher level club than vice versa. 60 As for clubs previously
involved in a player's education and training, if a player is transferred
from a third or fourth category club to a top club, once the transferring
club has been paid, a larger percentage will be paid to previous clubs
than would be if the transfer is from clubs in the same category."6 1
Finally, no training compensation will be available when a player over
the age of twenty-three is transferred. 62
0 As further protection for the developmental clubs, a solidarity
mechanism provides that every mid-contract transfer or movement will
result in five percent of the subsequent compensation being paid to the
clubs involved in the training and education of that player."63 This five
percent will then be divided between all of the involved clubs according
to a formula depending on the age of the player when he was with the
club."6"
N In an effort to maintain contractual stability, players under the
age of twenty-eight will be subject to sporting sanctions in the case of a
unilateral breach during the first three years of the contract. 465 For play-
ers over the age of twenty-eight, the same rules apply for a breach dur-
ing the first two years of the contract. 66 For breaches outside of these
protected periods, compensation will be required, and only the clubs
and/or the player's agent may be subject to sporting sanctions. 67
0 The sporting sanctions will result in a player being suspended for
the first four months of the beginning of the next season (assuming that
the breach takes place at the end of a season). 68 If there are "aggravat-
ing circumstances," such as failing to give notice or breaching multiple
times, the sanctions may reach six months. 4 69 For the new club, in the
case of a breach during the protected period, there is a presumption that
the club has induced the breach and it may be subjected to fines, deduc-
tion of points, or exclusion from competitions.47 °
E A player may be permitted to unilaterally breach during the pro-
459. See Application of Regulations, supra note 455, Ch. 3, art. 6.
460. Id. at Ch. 3, art. 7.
461. Id. at Ch. 3, art. 8.
462. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 7, art, 19.
463. Application of Regulations, supra note 455, Ch. 4, art. 10.
464. Id.
465. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 8, art. 21(l)(a).
466. Id. at Ch. 8, art. 21(l)(b).
467. Id. at Ch. 8, art. 21(2)(a).
468. Id. at Ch. 8, art. 23(1)(a).
469. Id. at Ch. 8, art. 23(l)(c).
470. Id. at Ch. 8, art. 23(2)(c) - (d).
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tected period, however, for "sporting just cause. '471 The Application of
Regulations document provides one specific example of this exception
- if a player can demonstrate at the end of the season that he played in
"less than ten percent of the official matches played by his club. 47 2
Other possible exceptions, to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
include "injury, suspension, player's field position, position in the team
(e.g. reserve goalkeeper), player's age, [and] reasonable expectations on
the basis of past career .. .
* In addition to sporting sanctions, compensation for the breach is
also potentially available.474 The compensation will be calculated "with
due respect to the national law applicable" and the "specificity of sport,"
and will take into account such objective criteria as: the value of the
contract (including non-contractual benefits); the remaining term of the
contract; the amount of fees or expenses already spent by a club under
the contract; and whether the breach takes place during the protected
period.475
E In order to deal with disputes over compensation, sporting just
cause, and mid-contract breaches, a Dispute Resolution Chamber was
created, composed of an equal number of player and club representa-
476tives. Alternatively, the clubs and players may, in their collective bar-
gaining agreement, agree to create a "national sports arbitration tribunal"
that is composed of an equal number of player and club representa-
tives. 477 Finally, the Regulations also indicate that a player or club may
still seek resolution of their disputes before the national courts. 478
Following the release of the regulations to be implemented in Sep-
tember 2001, FIFPro vowed to continue with its litigation against FIFA,
but also wanted some time to review the new regulations.4 79  After
reviewing the documents, FIFPro sought an injunction against the
implementation of the regulations. FIFPro questioned whether the EC
was "competent to allow a private body of law like FIFA to establish
rules that deviate from European law. 4 8 °
As September drew closer, much speculation existed as to whether
471. Id. at Ch. 8, art. 24.
472. Application of Regulations, supra note 455, Ch. 5, art. 12.
473. Id.
474. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 7, art. 22.
475. Id.
476. Application of Regulations, supra note 455, Ch. 7, art. 15.
477. FIFA Regulations, supra note 453, Ch. 14, art. 42(l)(b)(i).
478. Id. at Ch. 14, art. 42(1).
479. See Session Against Legality of New Transfer System Postponed, FIFProNet International,
at http://www.fifpronet.comlindex.php?mod=one&id=2927 (on file with author).
480. Court Case Against New Transfer System Adjourned Against the Will of FIFA, FIFProNet
International, at http://www.fifpronet.comindex.php?mod=one&id=2983 (on file with author).
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the new regulations would change anything and whether they would
work at all. Legal experts believed that transfer fees would continue to
rise along with player wages.48" ' Additionally, some believed that cer-
tain clubs might avoid transfers altogether because of the uncertain
nature of player contracts and the ease with which these contracts could
now be broken.4"2 Finally, many clubs anxiously waited for an explana-
tion from FIFA as to how the whole system was to work.483
The much anticipated clarifications from FIFA arrived in a twenty-
page circular dated August 24, 2001. 48 Stealing the spotlight, however,
was the announcement that FIFA had brokered a settlement with FIFPro
under which FIFPro agreed to drop its legal challenges.485 Under the
agreement between the two sides, FIFPro would now provide represent-
atives for the Dispute Resolution Chamber and would nominate repre-
sentatives for the Arbitration Tribunal for Football.486  These
appointments were significant since they meant that FIFPro would be
well represented in hearings in which the sporting sanctions may be
assessed.
Lost in the happiness of the settlement was FIFA's failure to clarify
the new system to the national associations throughout Europe. 487 As a
result, the EC considered taking legal action against FIFA, calling the
situation a "complete mess. '48 8 Because of the confusion, UEFA had
already told the national associations to continue under the old system
until FIFA got around to explaining things. 489
Additionally, UEFA remained in the dark as to the specifics of the
compromise agreement between FIFA and FIFPro.49° It was soon
revealed, however, that FIFA had "moved the goalposts" by changing
481. Nick Harris, Football: Who Said It Was Goodbye to the Big Buys? Summer Boom Hints
that the New System Will Not Herald a Slump in Transfer Fees, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug.
7, 2001, at 18, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
482. See id.
483. Ebbe's Race Against Time: Nine Days to Strike it Right, ABERDEEN EVENING EXPRESS,
Aug. 23, 2001, at 56, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
484. See FIFA Circular No. 769 (Aug. 24, 2001) (on file with author).
485. Players' Group Settles with FIFA over Transfer Plan, ESPN.com., Aug. 31, 2001, at
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the transfer regulations from those ratified in July.491 Significantly, in
an effort to appease FIFPro, the new regulations would not allow train-
ing compensation to a club when the under twenty-three player's con-
tract expires.492 In addition, in the case of a breach of a contract by a
player under twenty-eight, sporting sanctions would only be applied if
the breach occurred within the first two years of the contract.493 The
"new" rules stated that a suspension could only be for a maximum of
four months unless there were aggravating circumstances that could
extend the suspension to six months.494 As a result, a player could now
break his contract with his club in August and could be playing for a
new club by December; but, under the previously ratified regulations,
that same player could not play for another club during the rest of the
season and up to four months of the following season. Finally, there
was some evidence that FIFPro was to be given greater representation
on the Dispute Resolution Panel than the clubs, thus further diminishing
the power of the sporting sanctions.495
As if the regulations had not been confusing enough, UEFA and
European clubs were in a state of shock and disbelief following these
revelations.4 96 Without proper drafting, most clubs believed that the
regulations were a "recipe for chaos" and would ultimately hurt the
players that FIFPro allegedly represented.4 97 At least one insider pre-
dicted that some form of litigation might be necessary in order to sort
out the mess.4 98
FIFA reassured UEFA and the European clubs, however, that there
was no separate agreement with FIFPro and that the circular had not
replaced the ratified regulations.4 99 Consistent with the recurring tug-of-
war between the different sides, this reassurance heightened FIFPro's
scrutiny of the operation of the new transfer system and led, again, to
491. Vivek Chaudhary, Vivek Chaudhary Uncovers the Stories Behind the News, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 22, 2001, at 11, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File.
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hints of possible legal action. °°
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Why the delays? Who is to blame?
For the past twelve months, FIFPro has been a thorn in the side of
the negotiations with the EC over the transfer system. The players'
union has repeatedly called for footballers to be treated as normal work-
ers within the EU so they can leave their employers with proper notice.
To begin, this view is flawed because it shows an absolute disregard for
the integrity of the sport and its competitions. While a players' union
should be looking out for the best interests of its members, it should also
take into account the needs of the sport, because without the sport, there
is no need for the players. This is a lesson that must be learned by
players' unions on both sides of the Atlantic.
Second, FIFPro's interference with the negotiations have been frus-
trating for those involved because of its shifting views over the course of
the transfer controversy. As mentioned above, in the mid-1990s, FIFPro
refused to stand beside Jean-Marc Bosman because of concerns over the
long-term effects of the "free agency" that the Bosman decision ulti-
mately created. Subsequently, as the current transfer crisis picked up
steam in 1999, FIFPro's Gordon Taylor criticized the EC's view on mid-
contract transfers, believing that the system in place was important to
"long-term planning" and "stability. '50 1 Additionally, as the EC
threatened to dismantle the transfer system in the fall of 2000, Taylor
argued that these changes could damage the foundation of the sport. 5 1 2
As the transfer task force prepared its proposals for submission to the
EC, however, FIFPro's attitude became increasingly belligerent towards
the task force and FIFA/UEFA officials.
So what changed FIFPro's stance on the transfer system to the
point where it felt confident enough to seek legal action to force its will
upon the other parties to the negotiations? One source of this confidence
may have come from EC warnings that FIFPro's input was necessary for
a compromise. Following the public quarrel between Taylor and FIFA's
Blatter in October 2000, FIFPro appears to have recognized the power it
potentially held over the negotiations.
As the negotiations stretched into 2001, FIFPro began to exercise
this power excessively, to the point where even the EC recognized that a
deal had to be made with the football authorities with or without FIFPro.
500. See id.
501. Harris & Verkaik, supra note 205, at 23.
502. See Hughes, supra note 232, at 18.
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With the support of the EC lost, FIFPro could do nothing but threaten
legal action against the enforcement of the new transfer regulations. But
FIFPro must have realized that its chances of success in court were poor
before it agreed to a compromise with FIFA. With the uncertain nature
of this compromise, however, it is difficult to safely predict that no fur-
ther troubles will come from the players' union.
A weakness that FIFPro must address following this conflict is the
accusation that it does not truly represent the ideas and desires of the
players. Throughout the controversy, many - some players, some
coaches, and others - have voiced concerns that the players were una-
ware of what was happening. Not all of the player voices have come
from the smaller clubs, although they stand to be hurt more than the
larger clubs by the transfer changes. Top players from the Premier
League have also questioned FIFPro's tactics. If these statements are
any indication as to the opinion of the majority of players, perhaps
Gordon Taylor and the rest of the FIFPro officials should take a step
back and look at the direction in which they have threatened to take their
organization, their players, and their sport.
But FIFPro is not the only one to blame for the transfer difficulties.
As the leader of international football, FIFA took control of the transfer
negotiations from the beginning and has bumbled along ever since.
Since the summer of 2000, FIFA has shown a remarkable capacity for
saying one thing to its members, namely UEFA, and doing the complete
opposite. Nowhere was this more apparent than with the recent
backroom compromise with FIFPro in which FIFA may have altered the
already-ratified transfer regulations. While UEFA, had it been duly
informed, might have supported such a compromise, it was a difficult
pill to swallow since FIFA allegedly changed the regulations without
any consultation. FIFA's "double-speak" problem may only worsen
now that it denies altering the regulations since FIFPro is under the
impression that these changes have been made.
As the leader of what it calls the "football family," FIFA should act
more as the strong leader of this family and should do more to unite the
differing groups rather than keep them apart. Under the Blatter adminis-
tration, FIFA has mishandled the transfer negotiations from the start and
has kept UEFA and FIFPro at odds with one another. While these two
parties admittedly represent divergent viewpoints, they can, and must, be
brought together for the future health of the sport. However, making
side-deals with one side while privately reassuring the other side that
nothing has changed is not the way to protect the future health of foot-
ball. Therefore, FEFA and its members must look back at how the trans-
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fer problems were handled and must decide whether it is a question of
leadership that can be mended.
B. The New Transfer System - Will it Work?
The fate of the new transfer system as the new regulations are
implemented within the EU lies largely in the hands of UEFA, FIFPro,
and the national associations. FIFA's failure to clarify the regulations
will force others to interpret the regulations and will lead to differing
views. An example of the difficulties may be found with the instituting
of the two transfer windows during a season. The regulations leave the
exact dates of these windows to the discretion of each national associa-
tion. Therefore, a problem could arise for cross-border transfers if, for
example, Italy chooses a different mid-season transfer window from that
of England.
There is also the question of the effectiveness of the new transfer
regulations. First, the regulations do not cover amicable transfers.
Therefore, transfers of astronomical values will continue where the clubs
and the player all agree on the transfer. Second, the regulations permit a
player to unilaterally breach his contract and join another club (who is
willing to buy out his previous contract) after only a four-month suspen-
sion. Some have voiced a concern that rather than the "sporting sanc-
tion" it was intended to be, the "four month rule" will become the
default transfer rule. Additionally, with the "sporting just cause" excep-
tion, the regulations provide an escape for a player from the sporting
sanctions. This vague exception is an attorney's dream as the regula-
tions call for it to be judged on a case-by-case basis, according to the
specifics of that player's case. The dispute tribunal must be careful to
narrowly interpret this exception in order to ensure that the sporting
sanctions do not become a toothless tiger. Otherwise, the day may yet
be seen where a player is allowed to unilaterally breach his contract
because his coach is too hard on him. Finally, one has to wonder how
long it will take a club or player who is unsatisfied with the result under
the transfer regulations to turn to the national courts for relief since the
regulations specifically allow players and clubs to seek redress in the
courts. Once this precedent is set, chaos may ensue.
The future is very uncertain for smaller clubs under the new regula-
tions. Many worry that the transfer windows will prevent them from
fielding competitive teams. Even more important, until the training
compensation and solidarity provisions have been seen in practice,
developmental clubs will hold their collective breath as they wait to see
whether the funds will enable them to continue with their training acade-
mies under the new system. If these clubs falter under the new system,
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there will likely be public outrage; the likes of which these transfer
negotiations have not seen. At the same time, larger clubs will take over
the training duties of the sport's future stars (a result that would only add
fuel to the public's fire).
It also remains to be seen whether the players will be better off
under a system where they can unilaterally breach a contract after a spe-
cific amount of service. This will undoubtedly lead to shorter-term con-
tracts and constant renegotiation. While this may prove very profitable
for the David Beckhams and Luis Figos of the world, it will put much
more pressure on average players to stand out and will result in far less
contractual security for these players. But the players should be pleased
that FIFPro's contractual stability provisions were not adopted since this
would have allowed breach after only one year and would have made
player contracts even more unstable.
The simplest answer to the question asked by the title of this sec-
tion is, Who knows? Two months from now, or even two weeks from
now, FIFPro may again seek to enjoin the implementation of the regula-
tions. FIFA and UEFA may fail to correctly implement the regulations;
or the regulations may be implemented and prove to be a colossal fail-
ure, forcing the parties to return to the previous system for the time
being. One thing is for sure, with the "football family," nothing is cer-
tain and, more significantly, nothing is easy. Only time will tell whether
this cycle may be finally broken and peace may reign over football.
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